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I. Introduction
The skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates of recent years are well known. Last year over
1.3 million families filed for bankruptcy. Amazingly, that figure actually represented a slight drop
from the previous year. Anxious to deflect blame from an overly generous bankruptcy system
or a decline in the shame and stigma traditionally associated with filing bankruptcy, opponents of
bankruptcy reform have fingered promiscuous lending practices by credit card issuers as the
primary culprit in the bankruptcy boom.1 In particular, it is charged that, spurred on by high
profits, credit card issuers have extended increasing amounts of credit to ever-riskier
borrowers. If this is so, then the credit card companies have no one to blame but themselves
when these borrowers default on their obligations, file for bankruptcy, and impose losses on
lenders. For similar reasons, some bankruptcy judges have frowned upon dischargeability

1

See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 224-28 (1999)
[hereinafter Jones & Zywicki].
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objections by credit card issuers. Moreover, it is said to be the height of hypocrisy for these
same credit card issuers to then turn around and demand tighter bankruptcy laws to bail them
out of this problem of their own making. Finally, it is argued that because these losses simply
come out of the “profits” of credit card issuers, bankruptcy simply results in a wealth transfer
from lenders to borrowers and no resultant efficiency loss for other consumers.
But this theory rests on a substantial number of questionable assumptions about nature
of the credit card market and about the nature of rational credit card use by consumers. It
assumes a persistent failure of competition in the credit card market, despite the existence of
thousands of firms, low barriers to entry, and high levels of dynamic competition during the very
period that high profits supposedly persisted. It further assumes a remarkable degree of
consumer irrationality, requiring consumers to underestimate their credit card bills – and only
their credit card bills and none of their other financial obligations – month after month and year
after year. It requires assuming that consumers never become more intelligent about their
options, despite billions of dollars spent by credit card companies to inform consumers of the
different product options that are available to them. It requires a belief that the sole indicium of
competition in this market is the responsiveness of credit card interest rates despite the fact that
only a minority of credit card users revolve balances from month to month. The thesis requires
assuming that credit card users are homogenously concerned only about interest rates and not
about any other term of the credit card contract, whether benefits, grace periods, or annual fees.
In short, for the argument to be plausible, it requires a series of heroic assumptions about
persistent profits in a market with low barriers to entry, a failure of competition in a market with
all structural indicia of competitiveness, a peculiar and extraordinarily narrow definition of the
3

indicia for measuring competition, and a failure of consumer rationality in a situation where there
are strong incentives for consumers to act rationally and to learn over time.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the credit card market is competitive and that
consumers use credit cards rationally. As this article will show, both credit card issuers and
consumers appear to act in a manner consistent with the predictions of economic theory. It is
not necessary to rely on implausible assumptions about consumer irrationality or to devise
idiosyncratic models of a failure of competition in the credit card market. This article will
present voluminous empirical evidence – most of which has heretofore been ignored in the legal
literature – demonstrating that the operation of the credit card market and consumer choice is
consistent with rational decision-making subject to constraints. This article will show that credit
card users are not homogenous indeed, it will show that most credit card users will be largely
indifferent to interest rates, and that this indifference is rational. Moreover, this suggests that
there is some efficiency loss as a result of bankruptcy, and that at least some of the losses of
credit card issuers are absorbed by other consumers.
As this paper will show, the analytical premises that underlie the purported link between
credit cards and bankruptcy are suspect. There are simply too many holes in the story and too
many implausible assumptions that undercut the proffered link. Because these factual predicates
are necessary for the argument against credit cards to succeed, their failure brings the whole
edifice of the purported credit cards—bankruptcy link down with it. Without an explanation for
long-term, persistent economic profits there is no basis for assuming that credit card issuers will
continue to expand credit to ever more risky borrowers. Without an explanation for long-term,

4

persistent consumer irrationality then the entire explanation for economic profits collapses. And,
in fact, it turns out that the purported link itself is bereft of empirical support.2
This is not to deny that there may be abuses in the credit card market, as with any
lending market, that require further disclosure or other forms of substantive consumer protection
regulation. If so, then those proposals should be considered and dealt with on their merits. I
offer no opinion on that issue here. But issues of abuse and inadequate disclosure are separate
from issues related to bankruptcy. Tying credit card regulation to bankruptcy reform confuses
two distinct issues and risks simultaneously disfiguring both bankruptcy law and credit card
regulation. Bankruptcy is at the periphery, not the center, of the debate over credit cards.
Finally, too many bankruptcy policy-makers and judges have been distracted by the
erroneous model that dominates current discussion on the topic of credit cards and bankruptcy,
leading to ill-advised legislative reform proposals and confused judicial decision-making. If
enacted, these policies will have little negative impact on the upper-middle class academics,
judges, and lawyers who propound them but who also can easily escape their reach. On the
other hand, these policies could have dramatic negative consequences for vulnerable lowincome consumers who lack the borrowing options of wealthier individuals and as a result may
be driven back into the hands of pawnbrokers, rent-to-own financiers, and loan sharks who
flourished prior to the deregulation of the credit card market. A proper understanding of the
economics of credit cards is necessary for a proper understanding of the root causes of the
bankruptcy crisis.

2

See infra notes 263-92 and accompanying text (presenting brief discussion of the purported link between
credit cards and bankruptcy). A full critique of the purported link between credit cards and bankruptcy is
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II. Modeling Credit Card Use by Consumers
Credit cards perform two functions.3 First, they may be used as a transactional
medium, as a substitute for cash and checks. Second, they may be used as credit, as a
substitute for other forms of short-term, small-dollar value credit, such as layaway plans, pawn
shops, and short-term bank loans. Bankruptcy commentators have largely focused on the latter
use, decrying the seemingly high interest rates of credit cards as a form of credit and using this
as evidence of consumer irrationality and lender exploitation. Both this focus on credit cards
primarily as a form of credit, and the conclusion that such use is irrational, are incorrect.

A. Credit Cards as a Transactional Medium
The primary use of credit cards today is as a transactional medium, not as a source of
credit. Over half and probably as much as 68% of credit card users should be considered
“convenience users,” who use credit cards primarily as a transactional medium and who pay off
their balances in full each month.4 Moreover, convenience use of credit cards is rising much

presented in Todd J. Zywicki, Credit Cards and Bankruptcy (Aug. 28, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author at George Mason University School of Law) [hereinafter Zywicki, Credit Cards].
3
See Dagobert L. Brito & Peter R. Hartley, Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards, 103 J. POL. ECON. 400,
401 (1995).
4
See Thomas F. Cargill & Jeanne Wendel, Bank Credit Cards: Consumer Irrationality versus Market
Forces, 30 J. CONSUMER A FF. 373, 379 (1996) [hereinafter Cargill & Wendel] (noting that 68% of users
“nearly always” pay their full balance every month); Randall J. Pozdena, Solving the Mystery of High Credit
Card Rates, 42 FRBSF W EEKLY LETTER 1 (1991) (stating “over half” of card users do not revolve debts);
Delinquency on Consumer Loans: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th
Cong. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Crone, Delinquency], (testimony of Kenneth Crone) (“[M]ore than half of the
usage of bankcards is for ‘convenience’ use only, which is paid off immediately, without revolving.”); Glenn
B. Canner & James T. Fergus, The Economic Effects of Proposed Ceilings on Credit Card Interest Rates, 73
FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Canner & Fergus]. “In 1983, as in 1977, about half of families that used
bank or retail credit cards stated that they nearly always paid their bills in full each month . . . . Such
consumers can be considered convenience users.” Id at 5; LEWIS M ANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD

6

faster than revolving use of credit cards, increasing 20% in one year alone.5 According to a
recent Visa study it is also estimated that “almost 60 percent of total bankcard volume generates
no interest, up from roughly 50 percent six years ago.”6
The high rate of convenience use of credit cards relative to revolving use reflects the
attractiveness of credit cards as a transactional medium. This attractiveness stems from two
basic sources. First, credit cards enable individuals to minimize their cash balances, thereby
allowing them to shift their assets into higher-return investments. Second, there has been an
explosion in consumer demand for credit card use, largely as the result of the convenience of
using credit cards as a mechanism for conducting transactions.
In any given transaction, a consumer will have any number of options as to how to pay
for the purchase.7 Consumers will choose their transactional medium according to the relative
costs and benefits of using one method over another. Three basic forms of transactional media
are available: cash, direct claims against a bank (checks or debit cards), or credit cards. The
attractiveness of credit cards relative to these other media explains the rise of credit cards as a
dominant method of making transactions.

INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 139 (1990) (noting that by the late 1980s the proportion of users who paid in full
each month was approximately 50%, a figure that had remained relatively constant since 1970). But see
Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 A M. ECON. REV. 50, 71
(1991) [hereinafter Ausubel, Failure of Competition] (noting that three-quarters of credit card users revolve
balances). However, this assertion is simply incorrect. For a discussion of the various errors that Ausubel
committed in calculating this figure, see Cargill & Wendel, supra at 379-80.
5
See Crone, Delinquency, supra note 4, at 1 (ascribing the rise in convenience to use to a growth in the
number of retailers accepting credit cards and the popularity of co-branded cards among consumers); see
also Pozdena, supra note 4 (noting that the use of credit cards as a payment device is growing at a rate of
about 10% per year and the amount of credit card debt outstanding is growing at only 6% per year).
6
Crone, Delinquency, supra note 4, at 1.
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1.

Cash

A consumer can use cash. Obtaining and using cash to finance transactions has very
few benefits in the modern era relative to the alternatives. There are also substantial transaction
costs associated with acquiring cash, most notably the requirement to actually go to the bank to
withdraw it. Although this cost has declined with the spread of automatic teller machines
(ATMs), withdrawals from the ATMs of other banks requires the payment of a fee. Overall,
the transaction costs of obtaining cash at the margin makes cash relatively less attractive than
alternatives that do not require this.
Cash is also unattractive as a primary transactional medium in that it earns no interest
when it is in your wallet. Indeed, because of inflation, cash carried in your wallet earns a
negative rate of return.
Cash also has limited utility for conducting many transactions. For instance, cash cannot
be used to pay bills or make purchases through the mail. Other cash transactions require the
creation of a formal receipt to memorialize the transaction.
Cash does have some benefits for some transactions. Cash provides anonymity,
whereas checks and credit cards do not. It seems doubtful, however, that the desire for
anonymity will be very high in many cases.
Thus, it seems that cash will be the preferred purchasing mechanism only for extremely
low-value transactions: lunch, a newspaper, or a cup of coffee. In those cases, cash provides a
speedy way of effectuating a small transaction. One need not carry large cash balances to

7

See also DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PAYMENT CARD
INDUSTRY 5-15 (1993) [hereinafter EVANS & SCHMALENSEE] (giving a similar discussion to that presented
here).
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engage in these transactions and the speed and convenience of cash is desirable. Even in 1976,
before the rise of credit cards and electronic commerce, cash was used primarily only for small
transactions.8 Larger transactions at that time were conducted by checks. Credit cards were in
small use and “[d]ebit cards were essentially nonexistent.”9 Today, cash continues to be used
primarily for small transactions and thus is not really a very useful transactional medium for many
transactions.10
In recent years, credit cards have increasingly become an effective cash substitute. This
is primarily the result of technological advancements that have increased credit card processing
speed.11 As a result, credit cards are now accepted in such places as fast food restaurants,
coffee shops, parking garages, supermarkets, movie theaters, and taxi cabs.
A recently evolved alternative to cash has been the spread of “debit cards.” Debit
cards provide an electronic confirmation of sufficient funds at the time of the transaction. Until
recently, debit cards were still rarely used, but now their use has started to rise. Somewhat
surprisingly, however, debit cards appear to be a substitute for cash rather than checks, as their
use has grown most in venues such as grocery stores and gas stations.12 This development is
probably the result of increased processing speed of new electronic processing mechanisms.

8

See Kenneth E. Scott, Electronic Commerce Revisited, 51 STAN . L. REV. 1333, 1339 (1999).
Id.
10
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91
M ICH. L. REV. 237, 252 (1992) (noting that transactions that cannot be effectuated by credit card “are usually
either very small, in which case the consumer can settle accounts with case, or very large, in which case the
consumer can pay by means outside the banking system, such as by drawing a check on a mutual fund”).
11
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 86-87.
9

9

2.

Checks

Checks have traditionally served as the primary transactional mechanism for larger
consumer purchases. One suspects, however, that this primacy has been by default – there
were many transactions for which cash was simply not a viable alternative, and hence were
conducted by check. These include paying bills by mail and making larger purchases for which
one did not want to carry cash balances on one’s person. Again, using 1976 as a benchmark,
although 66% of transactions at that time were conducted by cash, over 90% of dollar
payments were carried out by checks.13 Because checks were a higher-transaction cost
medium, they were used primarily for larger-value purchases that justified using these higher
transaction-costs.
The problem with checks, however, is that they are fundamentally in the nature of a
credit transaction. 14 By writing a check, an individual is representing that she has sufficient funds
to cover the check when it is drawn. The merchant, however, has no way of confirming this fact
at the time the check is written. Moreover, even if there are sufficient funds at the time the
check is written, there may not be sufficient funds at the time the check goes to the bank to be
cleared. As a result, merchants suffer potentially large risks of non-payment from the use of a
check. Merchants can do little ex ante to reduce this risk.
There also is little reason to believe that individual retail merchants are in the best
position to monitor or bear the risk of non-payment of checks. Merchants have a comparative
advantage in bearing the risk of quality defects with respect to some of the goods they sell.

12
13

See Scott, supra note 8, at 1339.
Id.

10

However, it is doubtful that retailers have any comparative advantage in bearing the risk or
monitoring that a consumer will fail to make good on a check that is written. They may have the
ability to “spread” some of their losses onto other buyers, but even this will be limited in a
competitive market. Moreover, it is likely that these losses will fall heavier on small businesses,
which will have less ability to spread them over their lower sales volumes. Casual empiricism
tends to support this, suggesting that small merchants are less likely than larger merchants to
accept personal checks. It is difficult to imagine that they can really do much to ensure that
funds sufficient to cover a check will actually be available some days later when the check is
drawn against the writer’s account. As a result, forcing merchants to bear this risk does not
seem efficient in any way. Credit cards enable merchants to shift the risk of a bounced check
and consumer default to a lower-cost risk-bearer, a bank or financial institution, that can
monitor such risks.15
To minimize this risk, and to increase the reliability of the consumer’s promise to pay,
laws have established several deterrence schemes. In addition to giving the merchant a claim
against the check-writer for damages, some states allow presentation of checks without
sufficient funds to be the basis for criminal penalties. At the very least, banks and merchants
assess a penalty of $20 or more for bouncing a check. These penalties are necessary because
of the status of a check as essentially a credit transaction, where a consumer is making a naked
promise to pay for goods or services and the seller has no ability to verify the credit-worthiness
of the buyer with respect to that transaction.

14

See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Rep. 95-989 (1978) (“Normally, a check is a credit
transaction.”).

11

In recent years, checks have yielded to credit cards as a medium of exchange for
larger-value, especially retail, transactions. Thus, while cash and checks are still used in roughly
95% of all payment transactions, they constitute only 77% of the total dollar value of
transactions.16 “The greatest growth (in terms of dollar value) has come in credit cards, which
doubled from ten to twenty percent of the total between 1975 and 1995, reducing the share of
checks accordingly. Cash held its own, and debit cards have made hardly a dent.”17 This
erosion is expected to continue in the future. By the year 2005 it is predicted that only 29% of
transactional dollar volume will be conducted by check, while credit card volume is expected to
rise to 28%. Debit cards are expected to rise to 20% of volume and direct electronic transfers
to 11%. Cash transactions are also expected to fall to 12% of volume, as electronic cashsubstitutes become more popular.
Thus, while cash retains its appeal for small transactions, the reduction in transaction
costs of using credit cards has caused them to supplant checks as a mechanism for conducting
larger and non-face-to-face transactions. Consistent with the predictions of economic theory, it
appears that rational consumers have consciously decreased their use of checks and increased
their use of credit cards as the latter medium has become more attractive as a means of
financing current purchases.

15

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at vii.
See Scott, supra note 8, at 1339.
17
Id.
16
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3.

Credit Cards

Recent decades have seen a massive expansion in the use of credit cards as a
transactional medium. Some commentators have incorrectly ascribed this explosion to the
efforts of deregulated card issuers to “push” credit cards on unsuspecting consumers. This
argument lacks merit and will be discussed in some detail below.18 A more plausible
explanation for the rise of credit cards as a transactional medium is their convenience and the
other benefits they offer.19 In particular, credit cards have increasingly supplanted checks as the
preferred medium for transactions traditionally conducted by check. Thus, it is likely that the
explosion in consumer demand for credit cards is the result of rational consumer choice, rather
than improper creditor action.
Credit cards offer two transactional advantages over cash and checks. First, unlike
cash and checks, credit cards make it unnecessary to maintain cash reserves sufficient at all
times to cover current expenditures.20 Second, credit cards offer several ancillary benefits
unavailable to cash and credit cards.
Credit cards provide flexibility for consumers in matching their income and expenditure
streams by alleviating the need to maintain sufficient funds at all times to cover current
expenditures. Rather than necessitating an ongoing maintenance of cash balances, credit cards
necessitate holding only enough cash to cover a check to pay the credit card bill once a month.

18

See infra notes 231-65 and accompanying text.
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 229 (“Theories whose validity depends on the assumption that
consumers are stupid about their money ought to arouse suspicion. And, unsurprisingly, a more plausible
explanation is available.”).
20
Brito & Hartley, supra note 3, at 401.
19
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It is only when that single check is presented for clearance that the consumer must ensure that
she has sufficient funds to honor the check.
The simple convenience of being able to make a purchase today without having to
worry about the exact amount of funds available makes credit cards a convenient transactional
medium. The convenience of credit cards is illustrated by an example provided by Brito and
Hartley. They estimate that if bank accounts are earning a real interest rate of 4.2% annually
(higher than most money market and passbook accounts today), and credit card balances
accrue interest at 19.6% annually (several points higher than the prevailing norm today), and
credit cards begin to accrue interest immediately when charges are made (which is rarely the
case because most cards do not charge interest until after the close of the credit cycle and the
end of a subsequent grace period), credit cards would still be predicted to be used to finance
about 23% of consumer transactions.21 As suggested, this number certainly understates the
real-world percentage of transactions rationally financed by credit cards, as it overstates the
attractiveness of holding money balances, overstates the interest rate on credit cards, and
unrealistically assumes that balances begin to accrue interest immediately. Adjusting for these
assumptions, the large number of convenience users in the population should not be surprising.
Credit cards also permit consumers to carry interest-free balances for almost two
months, as the cardholder can carry the balance interest-free not only during the credit cycle,
but even for a “grace period” of twenty or more days after the credit period ends.
Transactional users can avoid all interest charges by paying off the balance at the end of the

21

Id. at 406.
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period.22 By contrast, the credit card issuer carries an open, zero-interest account for this entire
period.23
Cash and checking accounts usually produce no or little interest; as a result, consumers
will seek to minimize the amount of time that their money sits in their wallets or in low-interest
checking accounts. Given the low interest rates of recent years, money market and checking
accounts have provided trivial rates of interest, and cash in your pocket earns a negative rate of
return because of inflation. By contrast, investments in the stock market and other investment
opportunities have provided very high rates of return. Given these high rates of return elsewhere
in the economy and the low rates of interest paid on cash balances in money market and
checking accounts, the opportunity cost of holding cash balances in recent years has been
extremely high. As a result, the opportunity to hold cash balances at a minimum amount has
been extremely attractive to consumers.
Indeed, it seems misleading to think of these convenience users of credit cards as
engaging in “credit” transactions at all. If a debtor intends to pay-off the debt at the end of the
month and in fact does so (as do the vast majority of credit card users), then this is no more a
credit transaction than is writing a check. In both cases, the purchaser is simply obtaining the
goods now and paying for them later. Those concerned with the growth in the number of
“credit transactions” that take place using credit cards ignore the fact that most of these
transactions are fundamentally no different from the time-honored practice of writing a check.

22

Id. at 401.
See also Donald D. Hester, Monetary Policy in the “Checkless” Economy, 27 J. FIN. 279, 285-86 (1972)
(“[T]he charge card allows [its owner] to shift the burden of carrying zero-interest-bearing transaction
balances from himself to those issuing the card for at least a month. With a charge card he can reduce his
demand account balance[s] . . . [and] it is less important to waste time and effort trying to minimize them.”).
23
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As suggested above, checks and convenience use of credit cards should be thought of
consistently. In this context it is also important to remember that a majority of card users pay
their balances in full each month, suggesting that consumers are primarily using credit cards as a
substitute for checks rather than as a source of credit.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand why the bankruptcy and legal community treat credit
card obligations differently from checks. Both credit cards and checks represent a promise to
pay. Outside bankruptcy, a breach of this promise can have similar consequences for the
individual. For instance, the failure to pay-off a balance on a credit card can result in interest
and finance charges. But the failure to hold funds sufficient to honor a check (i.e., the check
“bounces”) can also result in substantial financial charges and other penalties. In some states,
the failure to hold funds sufficient to honor a check can result in criminal penalties in certain
situations. I am unable to discern a principled distinction as to why the legal promise to honor a
credit card obligation should be excused so readily while the obligation to honor a check is
unquestioned.
Indeed, the similarity does not end there. Some commentators have criticized credit
card issuers on the ground that they are to blame for granting excessively high “pre-approved”
credit limits to borrowers. But is this really any different from a bank that sends you a stack of
blank checks upon opening a bank account?24 Everyone knows that you are only supposed to
write checks if you have adequate funds to honor them. The burden is on the check-writer to
be responsible to make sure that she has sufficient funds to honor the check – it is not the
bank’s responsibility. Again, it is hard to see how this responsibility changes when an individual

16

uses a credit card to pay for the purchase, rather than a check. In both cases, the individual is
promising to honor the obligation with sufficient cash revenues when the appropriate time
comes.25
Although most people use credit cards as a substitute for checks, credit cards do give
these users the option of revolving some or all of their debts if necessary or desirable. This
flexibility is unavailable from checks or cash, further adding to the attractiveness of credit cards
as a transactional medium.
Credit cards also offer a number of ancillary benefits unavailable from cash or checks.
Credit cards are far safer from theft than is cash, explaining the growing popularity of credit
cards among the elderly.
Credit cards are also extremely useful for travel, especially in foreign countries. The
ubiquitous acceptance of credit cards throughout North America and Europe make credit cards
an indispensable medium for reserving hotels, plane tickets, and the like.26 Car rental
companies require a credit card before renting a car.27 By contrast, merchants are reluctant to
accept out-of-state checks.28 The ease of credit card use for traveling makes traditional
“traveler’s checks” seem laughably inefficient by comparison.29

24

See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 235.
LA Capitol Federal Credit Union v. Melancon (In re Melancon), 223 B.R. 300 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1998).
26
Glenn B. Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Developments in the Pricing of Credit Card Services, 78 FED. RES.
BULL. 652, 655 n.8 (1992) [hereinafter Canner & Luckett].
27
Check cards are not an acceptable alternative in this instance, because of the possibility that the account
might be emptied by the lessee, or that the account balance might simply be insufficient to cover the cost of
the transaction.
28
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 12.
29
Id.; Jane Adler, Should You Leave the Card at Home? CREDIT CARD M GMT ., June 1, 1999, at 89.
25
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The competitive pressures of the credit card market have also encouraged card issuers
to offer a stream of ancillary benefits highly-coveted by consumers.30 Many companies award
frequent flyer miles and “bonus points” that can be redeemed for goods and services. Most
major credit card issuers offer 24-hour customer service, a popular option for time-strapped
families who often cannot accommodate their schedules to traditional “bankers’ hours.”
Customers can also use credit card services to challenge sums due on defective merchandise.
Indeed, some cards even offer purchase insurance if a product does turn out to be defective.
Cards provide a year-end listing of purchases, itemizing them by category for budget-planning
purposes and identifying potentially tax-deductible charges.31 Car rental insurance, travel agent
services, and a variety of other services round-out the menu. For those less interested in such
frills, Discover Card gives it users cash rebates on the amounts charged. Cash, checks, and
check-cards offer nothing approaching this wide range of benefits.32
The comparative advantage of credit cards over traditional purchasing media is even
greater in light of the fact that credit cards are the only viable alternative for conducting many
transactions. For some transactions, such as catalogues, Internet sales, and phone orders,
credit cards are essential. 33 These sectors of the retail market are the growing very rapidly and
have proven to be very popular with the public.34 As Lewis Mandell observes, credit cards
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The high degree of competition in the credit card industry and the effect it has had on the industry’s
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“have become an essential element of daily life. With a credit card, you can buy yourself a new
car. Without it, you cannot even rent one.”35
These benefits have been combined with other innovations that further increase the
convenience of credit cards relative to the alternatives, such as the opportunity at gas stations to
“pay-at-the-pump.” Moreover, increases in computing speed has made approval of charge
requests virtually instantaneous. Finally, cash advances are now available at almost every ATM
machine.
The advantages to consumers of using credit cards is matched by similar advantages to
merchants. As noted above, a problem with checks is that they force retailers to bear the risk
of nonpayment, a risk that the retailer is unlikely to be in an optimal position to bear. Credit
cards allow the retailer to shift this risk of nonpayment to the credit card issuer, a financial
institution that has superior risk-bearing and monitoring capability. Casual empiricism suggests
that checks have maintained their dominance as a transactional medium primarily in areas where
risk of nonpayment is extremely low, such as payment of utility bills. This suggests that the riskshifting function of credit cards is less necessary in those situations; thus, those vendors will be
reluctant to pay the fees associated with use of credit cards.
This ability to shift the risk of nonpayment will be especially important for smaller
businesses that will be at a comparative disadvantage in bearing this risk of nonpayment relative
to larger businesses. Thus, it is not surprising that credit cards were originally created by large
department stores. Large retailers could afford to make the up-front investments associated
with setting-up and running a system of customer credit and could bear the risk of
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M ANDELL, supra note 4, at xi.

19

noncollection.36 By combining credit operations with retail merchandising, department stores
retailers could bury their credit costs in the price of their goods and services by spreading the
costs across many transactions.37 Large retailers such as Sears, Montgomery Wards, and J. C.
Penney used credit card operations as a means to facilitate sales and to ensure customer
loyalty.38 As a result, they accepted little profit or even losses on their credit operations in
furtherance of these larger goals.39
The rise of Visa and MasterCard, therefore, has been most valuable for small retailers,
by allowing them to compete on equal terms with the retail behemoths such as Sears. The
development of a consumer credit network independent from any single retail establishment has
enabled retailers to separate the credit transaction from the retail transaction. This has allowed
small retailers to shift the risk of nonpayment to large financial institutions with a comparative
advantage in bearing the risk of non-payment and monitoring account-holders. Rather than
being forced to bear an uneconomical up-front investment in creating and maintaining a credit
operation, small retailers could pay a fee to the card issuer for the transaction. 40
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Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201,
238 (1986).
37
Id.; M ANDELL, supra note 4, at 23-24. See infra at notes325-31 and accompanying text (suggesting that
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usury restrictions).
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See M ANDELL, supra note 6, at xvii-xviii; id. at 48.
39
For similar reasons of trying to establish brand loyalty, gas cards have generally been money losers for oil
companies. Indeed, their costs go into the marketing budget. Id. at 102.
40
Id. at xviii (“Small retailers were precluded from running their own credit operations because of the high
costs; since they catered to a clientele that bought many consumer goods on credit, it made sense for them
to accept third-party cards. Furthermore, many small retailers, particularly the specialty stores, had little
need to ensure the loyalty of customers who visited their shops only occasionally.”); id. at 94; EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at vii; id. at 14. One news report discusses a dentist who says that if he did
not take credit cards, he would have to provide credit to some patients or lose their business. Barry Flynn,
Credit Cards Nick Small Stores, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 2, 1999, at D1 (“In that case, the costs
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said.”) available in 1999 WL 2753869.
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Shifting the risk of nonpayment to low-cost risk bearers has encouraged entrepreneurial
growth, making it easier for small companies to compete with large retailers who used to
dominate the retail credit market.41 Most notably, the successful creation and growth of small,
low-overhead Internet, computer, and catalogue businesses in recent years is hard to imagine
without the spread of credit cards as a purchasing mechanism. 42 Thus, the development of
credit cards has benefited consumers indirectly as well, by encouraging entrepreneurship and
permitting small retailers to compete with larger established retailers. Evans and Schmalensee
have summarized the mutual benefits of credit cards stating: “The transaction features of
payment cards provide real economic benefits. Consumers gain from increased convenience.
Businesses gain from reduced risk. Both gain from transactions that are made easier to
consummate.”43 Finally, credit cards can protect consumers from bearing the risk of nonperformance by start up businesses.44
In light of this manifest evidence of consumer rationality in the use of credit cards, the
obvious transactional advantages of using credit cards, and the efficiency gains of credit cards,
the hostility of bankruptcy commentators to credit cards is puzzling. Credit cards are arguably
the most important and valuable pro-consumer innovation of the past few decades, and among
the most important of all time.45 Through the creation of Internet, catalogue, and phone
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DeMuth, supra note 36, at 238.
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shopping, credit cards have heightened retail competition and driven down prices for average
consumers.
It is almost certainly the case that the rise in credit card use is the result of rational
consumer choice, rather than improper behavior by credit card issuers. Consumers have
enthusiastically embraced the convenience advantages and other benefits of using credit cards.
Quite frankly, cash and checks are horse-and-buggy consumer technology in the age of the
Internet. As Kenneth Scott observes, “The growth in both debit and credit has shifted
consumer payments away from paper mechanisms and will continue in the future.”46
Perhaps most fundamentally, critics and regulators of the credit card industry must keep
in mind that most credit card users are convenience users. By focusing solely on the smaller
group of credit card owners who revolve balances, bankruptcy theorists and government
regulators truly are studying the tail, rather than the dog. Regulators must be certain that in
trying to regulate revolving credit use, they do not interfere with convenience use of credit cards.
Preventing responsible individuals from getting access to credit cards as a result of illadvised government regulations would be a tragedy of the highest proportions. There is simply
no moral or economic justification for reserving to middle-class and wealthy people the
opportunity to buy books at Amazon.com, while forcing low-income people to pay higher
prices and suffer greater inconvenience at retail bookstores.
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See Scott, supra note 8, at 1341 fig. 1.
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B. Credit Cards as Borrowing Medium
Credit cards are also used by consumers as a borrowing medium. As noted,
bankruptcy commentators generally have ignored the transactional advantages of credit cards
and the reality that most credit card use is for convenience. Instead, they have focused their
attention on the use of credit cards as a borrowing mechanism.
Credit cards give users the opportunity to “revolve” debt from one month to the next,
requiring them to pay interest rates and sometimes other fees in order to do so. Bankruptcy
theorists have decried what they perceive to be exorbitantly high interest rates on these
revolving debts. These “high rates” speak for themselves, it is claimed. No rational consumer
would pay such “high rates” for credit, would they? These “high rates” are simply feeding bank
profits at the expense of powerless consumers, so forcing banks to reduce these “high rates” is
appropriate.
These attacks are again based on a misunderstanding of rational consumer behavior in a
competitive credit market. As this Section will show, given the alternatives, it is rational for
many consumers to revolve debt, using credit cards as a source of short-term, low-dollar
amount borrowing. As with convenience users, the attractiveness of credit cards as a
borrowing mechanism can be understood only by examining it in a comparative context.
Examined in a comparative context, credit card terms and interest rates that appear outrageous
to upper-middle-class scholars, lawyers, and judges with many credit options seem less onerous
to those who actually use credit cards as a borrowing source.
Consider an individual confronted with the need to make a consumer purchase, but
lacking sufficient savings to make the purchase out his current funds. Leave aside “big-ticket”
23

items such as homes and cars, for which there are well-developed secured lending markets to
finance those purchases. Instead, consider an individual confronted with the need to pay for an
unexpected car repair, a new appliance, or some new clothes to start a new job next week. In
short, say an individual has to come up with $1,000 immediately. Assume further that he has
insufficient savings and given his current income stream, he will not be able to repay the $1,000
for six months. What are his options?
If he is middle-class or wealthy, odds are he owns a home. Thus, his likely plan of
action would be to draw on the equity he has accumulated in his house through a home equity
loan or home equity line of credit. Not only would this be tax-deductible, but it is also
collateralized by equity in one’s home. Thus, it is available at very competitive rates of credit
and with minimal transaction costs. In short, middle-class borrowers will often have access to a
ready source of competitive credit in the form of the equity in their homes. Empirical evidence
supports this view that higher-income households will have access to a wider variety of
consumer credit (such as home equity loans) and thus will be less likely to carry balances on
credit cards.47
But very few poor or young people own homes and those that do will not always have
substantial amounts of equity available for consumer borrowing.48 Thus, a home equity line of
credit often will not be a viable option.49 What are the other available options?

47

Cargill & Wendel, supra note 4, at 385 (noting that as income increases “alternative and less expensive
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Id.
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See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that home equity loans “are not available to
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He could try to sell off his current assets, such as furniture, clothing, appliances, etc.
Consumer-to-consumer garage sales, however, are not likely to generate much in the way of
funds, and selling personal assets in this manner hardly seems like an attractive way to raise
funds in an emergency.
Rather than selling assets, he could take them to a pawn shop and pawn them.
Needless to say, pawning personal items is only marginally more attractive than selling them
outright and suffers many of the same drawbacks as a sale. Nonetheless, absent access to
better forms of credit, borrowers will resort to pawn shops. Thus, during the late-1970s,
Arkansas had very restrictive usury limitations in place that made it almost impossible to make a
profit on consumer loans, including credit cards. Predictably, fewer consumer loans were made
and more consumer loan applications were rejected, especially for higher-risk customers.50 It
appears that this market niche was filled by pawn shops, as pawn shops proliferated in
Arkansas during this period and pawnbrokers were more prevalent in Arkansas than in all other
credit markets combined.51 Thus, Carlos Cuevas is undeniably right in observing: “If there were
an interest rate ceiling on credit cards, then lending practices would change.”52 This is correct,
but not for the reasons he believes – credit card issuers would have fewer customers and pawn
shops and rent-to-owns would have more. It is unclear how increasing the market share of
pawn shops at the expense of credit card companies would benefit lower-income consumers.
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The consumer could go to a bank and try to get a six month loan for $1,000. If so, his
prospects for obtaining a loan on attractive terms are slim. Even if he is approved for the loan
with no collateral, the loan terms are likely to be somewhat onerous. Brito and Hartley report
that, “[a] senior bank officer told us that the costs to the bank of processing a loan are so high
that they cannot afford to make a loan of less than $3,000 for one year except at interest rates
above those charged on credit cards.”53 They also note, “inquiries in Houston in February
1992 revealed rates ranging from 17 percent and a $100 fixed fee for a collateralized 1-year
loan at a branch of a major national finance company to over 50 percent for small loans ($300
maximum) at a local finance company.”54 In short, bank loans of similar size and duration
“either do not exist or are available only at terms more onerous than those offered by credit
card issuers.”55
The high cost for small, short-term bank loans is attributable to the high transaction
costs associated with processing a bank loan. Many of these costs are fixed costs, such as
employee time, regulatory requirements, and paperwork, that remain constant regardless of the
size of the loan. Thus, the relative costs of processing the loan will on average be greater for
smaller loans than large.
Rather than dealing with the legal “loan sharks” at the bank, a borrower could descend
into the underworld of illegal loan sharks. Given the terms for short-term, low-amount loans
banks would offer, the loan terms offered by illegal loan sharks are probably not much more
burdensome. Of course, the lender’s collection remedies in the event of nonpayment may be
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Brito & Hartley, supra note 3, at 402 (emphasis added).
Id. at 402 n.6.
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somewhat less attractive and somewhat more painful than dealing with a bank. The persistence
of loan-sharking through time indicates that borrowers will resort to illegal and quasi-legal loan
sharks if other avenues are foreclosed.
For some transactions, it may be possible to finance them directly through the retailer
through a “rent-to-own,” or secured financing scheme.56 Of course, in many situations these
options will not be available, such as the purchase of a wardrobe or a plane ticket. And, in fact,
rent-to-owns have drawn criticism from many of the same people who have criticized the credit
card industry.57 Thus, while a secured financing scheme will sometimes present one option for
financing an emergency expenditure, this will not always be the case. And while secured
financing might be more attractive for financing the transaction than the alternatives previously
discussed, it still has substantial drawbacks.
Looked at in this comparative light, a rational consumer seeking to finance short-term
borrowing is likely to find a credit card quite an attractive option – even at the supposedly
“high” rates of interest charged by credit cards. Once approved for a credit card, a consumer
may borrow funds up to the credit limit at close to zero transaction costs. As Brito and Hartley
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conclude: “Even moderate transaction costs [for regular bank loans] can lead to substantial
borrowing on credit cards.”58
Empirical evidence strongly supports the thesis that the growth in credit card use by
low-income credit-constrained cardholders has been primarily a rational substitution towards
credit cards and away from less-attractive forms of consumer credit. Thus, credit cards have
not so much increased the ability of credit-constrained consumers to increase their borrowing,
as much as the cards have permitted those consumers to obtain access to previously unavailable
credit, on more competitive and attractive terms. A report from the Chicago Fed comments
that the growth in credit card debt among low-income borrowers is primarily a substitution for
other forms of credit: “[t]he increase in the credit card debt burden for the lowest income group
appears to be offset by a drop in the installment debt burden. This suggests that there has not
been a substantial increase in high-interest debt for low-income households, but these
households have merely substituted one type of high-interest debt for another.”59 Similarly,
when usury restrictions were in place, lower-income borrowers had difficulty gaining access to
consumer credit from banks. This difficulty forced lower-income borrowers to substitute other
forms of credit (making much greater use of pawn shops, for instance) for bank loans, but it did
not substantially affect their overall use of credit.60 Credit cards have been an especially
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attractive alternative to the old unsecured personal line of credit and have almost driven these
credit vehicles from the market completely.61
It is unfortunate that lower-income Americans do not have access to home equity loans
and other forms of debt provided at low interest rates. Those seeking access to credit confront
a variety of alternatives that all appear unattractive when compared to the options available to
middle-class borrowers. But simply wishing or assuming that low-income earners had access to
lower-cost credit does not make it available.62 Confronted by an array of imperfect options,
low-income borrowers act as rationally as everyone else. Given the attractiveness of credit
cards as a source of short-term, low-transaction cost credit, the substitution documented by
economists towards greater use of credit cards by credit-constrained low-income earners is
consistent with economic theory. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the plight of low-income
earners can be improved by denying them the option of using credit cards by making it more
difficult to gain access to credit cards, their reliance on pawn shops and loan sharks increases.

C. Understanding Consumer Demand for Credit Card Borrowing
Examined in a comparative light, therefore, it is difficult to understand how credit cards
could even be said to charge unduly “high” rates of interest. However, the analysis of whether
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an interest rate is “high” is comparative, not absolute. Compared to realistic and comparable
alternatives, credit card interest rates do not appear to be high.
Even trained economists seem to forget this basic economic lesson when discussing
credit cards.63 Professor Lawrence Ausubel, for instance, writes that “a credit card is really
quite an expensive medium on which to borrow” and suggests that the fact that some consumers
actually do borrow on credit cards presents a prima facie case of consumer irrationality. 64
Ausbel provides no explanation as to what the phrase “really quite an expensive medium”
means, and there is certainly no evidence that he has reached his conclusion by comparing credit
cards to other alternative forms of credit actually available to the borrowers in question. 65
Nor is this reliance on credit cards likely the result of consumer ignorance about the
interest rate they are paying. Studies show that “consumers are more sensitive to interest rates
than they are to any other aspect of the credit contract.”66 When relevant, consumers are well-
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aware of the interest rate they are being charged and have simply demanded alternative terms
for their borrowing contracts.
Ausubel adduces additional arguments to support the proposition that borrowing at
“high” credit card rates evidences non-optimizing consumer behavior. “One would expect that
optimizing behavior would lead many consumers to . . . shop around for lower-priced credit
cards . . . or rearrange their intertemporal stream of consumption (i.e., not borrow).”67 He
concludes that consumers fail to do so, leading to a failure of competition. But is his factual
premise true?

1.

Do Consumers Shop for Lower-Interest Rates?

Ausubel claims that confronted with such “high” credit card interest rates, rational
consumers would be expected to “shop around for lower-priced credit cards.” He provides no
reason why shopping for low interest rates would be the most reliable evidence of consumer
rationality. Ausubel’s error stems from using interest rates as the sole evidence of competition in
the credit card market, causing him to ignore the numerous other price and non-price margins
on which credit card issuers compete. In fact, the issue is more complicated and consistent with
rational economic behavior by both card issuers and consumers.
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a)

Interest Rates Are Irrelevant for Convenience Users

Contrary to Ausubel’s implicit assumption, credit card customers are not homogeneous
and do not choose their cards strictly on the basis of interest rates. Ausubel’s confusion resides
in the failure to recognize that credit cards are used by both convenience users and revolvers.
Credit card users are a heterogeneous lot, and the heterogeneity is driven primarily by whether
they are convenience users or revolvers. In return, suppliers of credit cards offer different
products to convenience users versus revolvers.
Most credit card users are convenience users who do not revolve a balance from month
to month. 68 “Consumers who pay their balances in full, of course, accrue no interest
charges.”69 As a result, while convenience users might be mildly interested in the interest rate,
they are likely to be far more interested in other card benefits, such as co-branding, “cash
back,” and other benefits of card use.70 Even leaving aside these ancillary benefits, convenience
users have been shown to be relatively unconcerned about credit card interest rates, but are
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quite sensitive to other price terms of the credit card agreement, such as the annual fee and the
length of the interest-free grace period.71 “Credit card pricing, however, involves [elements
other than interest rates], including annual fees, fees for cash advances, rebates, minimum
finance charges, over-the-limit fees, and late payment charges. In addition, the length of the
‘interest-free’ grace period, if any, can have an important influence on the amount of interest
consumers pay when they borrow on their credit cards.”72 Given that convenience users are
most interested in these ancillary benefits, or terms other than interest rates, it is not surprising
that this is the margin on which card issuers appear to be competing most heavily.73 As I have
written elsewhere, “using interest rates as the only proxy for vigorous competition is tantamount
to saying that the automotive industry is noncompetitive because car manufacturers increase
quality through improved safety, comfort, or gas mileage, rather than simply cutting prices. Such
a conclusion would obviously be incorrect when applied to cars, and it is equally incorrect when
applied to credit cards.”74

71

Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 663; Pozdena, supra note 4, at 2; Canner & Fergus, supra note 4, at 8
(noting that reduction in the grace period hurts convenience users); Ausubel, Failure of Competition,
supra note 4, at 72 (noting that credit card marketers report that consumers are much more sensitive to
increases in the annual fee than to increases in the interest rate).
72
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS 4 (Aug. 1998) [hereinafter PROFITABILITY 1998].
73
Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 663; Pozdena, supra note 4, at 2.
74
Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 232-33. See also DeMuth, supra note 36, at 230 (“It is, however,
consistent with the operation of competitive markets for firms, faced with declining costs and growing
demand, to expand output and improve product quality at a constant market price. Th[i]s is just what
happens when a credit card issuer offers more features and larger credit lines.”); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 7, at xi (“From the viewpoint of issuers and cardholders alike, the interest rate is just one of many
dimensions of a payment card.”); id. at 97 (“While economists are exploring the reasons why businesses
adjust different aspects of their product offerings and prices, there is little evidence that the failure to adjust
dollar prices signals a breakdown of competition.”). I personally have no idea what my credit card interest
rate is, nor do I care. Similarly, I suspect that most of the readers of this article neither know nor care about
their credit card interest rate. The reason is obvious. I, like most of the readers of this article, are upper
middle-class consumers who are convenience users of credit cards. Thus, I care much more about my
frequent flyer miles and rental car insurance than about the interest rate.
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The widespread use of interest rates as the sole proxy for competitiveness in the credit
card market leads to related errors on other aspects of credit cards and bankruptcy. Thus,
Ausubel notes that interest rates have also not increased despite mounting losses to credit card
issuers caused by the spiraling consumer bankruptcy filing rate.75 This analysis misses the point.
If the costs of other elements of card pricing have been falling (such as the cost of funds or
administrative costs) then the proper question is whether these bankruptcy losses have slowed
the drop in interest rates that would otherwise have occurred without those losses. The
bankruptcy losses may have simply offset other cost reductions that would have otherwise led
to rate reductions. Looking only for nominal interest rate increases simply asks the wrong
question.
Even assuming that interest rates have not been adjusted in response to bankruptcy
losses, this observation largely misses the point. Credit card issuers have responded to
increased bankruptcy losses in other ways. They have increased fees and penalties for late
payments and violations of the customer’s credit limit, so called “hidden fees.”76 Given that late
payments and overlimit charges are leading predictors of eventual default, these “hidden fees”
are targeted almost exclusively at high-risk card users who are most likely to default. Thus, it
seems obvious that the increase in these fees by card issuers is a direct response to the
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He has repeated this error elsewhere. For instance, in testimony on a bankruptcy reform bill, Ausubel
observed that even as bankruptcy losses to credit card issuers have risen, interest rates on credit cards
have remained constant. Thus, he concludes, “There is no empirical basis for arguing that a reduction in
bankruptcy losses will get passed through to consumers. The most likely effect is merely a windfall gain in
profits for lenders, and little or no benefit to consumers.” Bankruptcy Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3150
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1998) [hereinafter Ausubel, Hearings] (testimony of Prof. Lawrence M. Ausubel).
76
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 A M. BANKR. L.J.
249, 263 (1997) [hereinafter, Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults]. Ausubel does not identify any lack of
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increased default rate of recent years. By contrast, an increase in interest rates should
negatively affect all revolvers, regardless of whether they are actually higher-risk. No
explanation is provided for why credit card issuers would be expected to choose the lessefficient means of responding to increased defaults by increasing interest rates for all users, good
and bad risks alike, rather than using more-efficient, targeted means, such as increasing latepayment and over-limit fees. Nor is there an explanation for how consumers suffer when credit
card issuers respond to increased default rates by choosing a more efficient rather than a lessefficient response to the problem. Anecdotes indicate that credit card issuers routinely waive
these penalty charges when they are assessed against innocent low-risk cardholders who may
have accidentally missed a payment, but otherwise represent no default risk.77 Thus, the penalty
fees seem to be aimed at and enforced against only those who represent the largest default
risks, unlike interest rate hikes that affect all users.
In response to increased bankruptcies and bankruptcy losses, issuers also have
tightened their credit issuing standards and reduced credit limits.78 Thus, increased defaults have
led to increased credit rationing, imposing costs on those who otherwise would have been able
to get a credit card, but now are unable to do so. Bankruptcy losses also partially explain the

disclosure associated with either the existence or imposition of these fees, so it is not clear from the article
why these fees should be characterized as being “hidden” as opposed to “late” fees. Id.
77
See James J. Daly, Back from the Brink, CREDIT CARD M GMT ., May 1, 1998, at 54 [hereinafter Daly, Back
From the Brink] (“Despite rapid increases in penalty fees, with late fees jumping from an average of about
$18 to $20, the lower number of revolvers and banks’ unwillingness to anger their cardholders conspired to
keep actual [profit] category growth to a mere 2%.”); Carol Frey, Banks Put Squeeze on Prompt CardHolders, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 12, 1999, at D1, available in 1999 WL 2755062 (“[C]ustomers in
good standing often can have late fees removed from their bills just by asking.”); Lynn Arditi, Credit-Card
Late Fees Total $4 Billion a Year, BUFF. NEWS, May 11, 1999, at D2 (noting willingness of card issuers to
waive late fees for good customers). There have also been reports of massive card cancellations at First
USA in response to their plan to eliminate their one-day grace period on payments.
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steady erosion in the length of the non-interest grace period that has taken place in recent
years.79 Grace periods are a coveted benefit to cardholders but are expensive to issuers. Thus,
in part, cardholders have passed bankruptcy losses onto consumers through a reduction in the
value of a benefit previously offered and highly-coveted by convenience users especially. All of
these factors can be seen as part of the price paid by consumers for increased credit card
defaults, but none of them are directly reflected in the interest rate alone.
Issuers have also developed measures for indirectly charging convenience users for their
services. Credit card issuers have offset the rising tide of convenience users by increasing the
fees that they charge to retailers who accept their cards.80 Of course, some of these charges
are eventually cycled back into the retail price of the goods, thus providing a mechanism for at
least partially capturing increased convenience use.

b)

Larger Revolvers Shop for Lower Interest Rates

Although the majority of users are convenience users, who don’t care about interest
rates, there remains a smaller group of revolvers who may be somewhat more interested in
interest rates. A large number of revolvers carry relatively low balances, so it is doubtful that
even they will choose their cards purely on the basis of interest rates, especially if it requires
them to forgo other card benefits. Canner and Luckett observe that although
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See Mark M. Zandi & Celia Chen, Debt Service Relief, REGIONAL FIN. REV., Feb. 1998, at 11 (noting
tightening of lending standards by credit card issuers).
79
See Frey, supra note 77, at D1 (noting that some banks “have shaved three or four days off the time they
give card-holders to pay up, and now when payments are late, many banks show no mercy”); John Stewart,
Victims of Your Own Success, CREDIT CARD M GMT ., Sept. 1, 1998, at 160 (noting that “grace periods seem
to be quietly shortening”); see also Canner & Fergus, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that one way of repricing
credit card services is to reduce the length of the grace period).
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the amount of credit card debt owed by cardholders who revolve varies
substantially, a large fraction owe relatively small amounts. The 1989 Survey of
Consumer Finances, for example, revealed that, among cardholders with debt,
32 percent owed less than $500 at the time of the survey, and an additional 18
percent owed between $500 and $1,000. Thus, a significant number of those
who use credit cards as a borrowing device may have balances small enough to
render the interest rate a secondary consideration in deciding which cards to
hold.81
The trivial savings for the average revolver is evidenced by Canner and Luckett’s
observation that for a family owing the median level of credit card debt in 1989 (approximately
$1,250), “a 3 percentage point drop in the [interest] rate would reduce the annual interest
charge by less than $40.”82 As they conclude, “[i]t is questionable whether a $40 annual saving
would be enough to induce a cardholder to switch from a card that has been providing
satisfactory service or attractive enhancements.”83 Cargill and Wendell similarly observe that for
“each $100 of balance carried through the year, the consumer saves $1 per year for each 100
basis point reduction in the effective annual interest rate. Thus, a household with a balance of
$1,000 through the year can save only $10 per year for each 100 basis point reduction in the
interest rate.”84 Brito and Hartley estimate that it would take a difference in interest rates of
over 3% for an individual who carries a balance of about $1,000 to switch cards, and if they
carry the balance for less than the whole year, it would take an even larger interest rate
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See Flynn, supra note 40, at D1 (noting that banks have steadily raised the rates they charge stores that
accept credit cards, sometimes up to 3.5% for some sales).
81
Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 663.
82
Id. at 664.
83
Id.
84
Cargill & Wendel, supra note 4, at 380-81.
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difference to induce switching.85 Given that most consumers carry no balance and that most
revolvers carry relatively small balances, the vast majority of consumers will gain little benefit
from searching around for the lowest interest rate available. As Cargill and Wendel observe,
“[t]hese findings suggest that lack of consumer shopping for interest rates may be an entirely
rational household decision.”86 They further note that unless the search for a lower interest rate
“can be conducted quickly, easily, and with little resource cost, consumers may find it more cost
effective to use search time to catch a good sale at a supermarket or discount store.”87 Given
these modest benefits to switching cards purely on the basis of interest rates, even a relatively
small cost to the consumer will likely prevent the consumer from switching cards. It’s just not
worth it. Given the uncertainty, hassle, and information costs of switching cards, and the fact
that the consumer will likely have to sacrifice attractive ancillary benefits, it is untenable to
conclude that failure to switch cards in the face of relatively trivial benefits of a small reduction in
interest rates is evidence of consumer irrationality. Given the positive costs and relatively trivial
benefits for most people in shopping for a lower interest rate, it is surprising that a large number
of people do in fact search among cards for better interest rates and that they appear to act on
the basis of this information.88
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Brito & Hartley, supra note 3, at 409. Notably, if a consumer expected to finance a $1,000 balance for only
a month and the current interest rate was an astronomically high 23.87%, transaction costs of $1.52 would
still be sufficient to prevent a switch to a card with an interest rate of 19.56%. Id.
86
Cargill & Wendel, supra note 4, at 381.
87
Id.
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RASKOVICH & FROEB, supra note 70, at 9 (“[W]e [reject] . . . Ausubel’s hypothesis that consumers are
insensitive to the credit card interest rate . . . if the demand for credit card loans were perfectly inelastic, then
the entire shock to supply would be passed on to consumers through a commensurate change in the
equilibrium credit card interest rate, net of default losses. For cost shocks to be passed on only partially to
price, it must be the case that the demand for credit card loans slopes downward.”).
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As predicted by economic theory, it is primarily larger revolvers who will choose their
card on the basis of interest rates rather than other factors.89 Surveys indicate that revolvers are
more likely than convenience users to read credit card solicitation materials, and a larger
proportion of revolvers said that they would apply for a card with a lower rate if it were
offered.90 Moreover, the larger the outstanding balance a revolver carried, the more likely the
cardholder would be to apply for a lower-rate card.91 Thus, those consumers who would
expect to place a high premium on relative interest rates do, in fact, do so. They choose their
cards on the basis of such considerations. By contrast, interest rates matter little to most card
users and as a result, they choose their cards according to other criteria.
Card issuers have responded in kind, tailoring their products to the much-larger pool of
convenience users and low-revolvers who do not choose their cards primarily on the basis of
interest rates.92 Those who choose their cards primarily on the basis of interest rates are a small
percentage of the overall credit card pool, thus it makes little sense to design one’s standard
product to capture that group. While it may worthwhile to try to design a special product for
that group, such economic discrimination will be difficult to design and enforce. Canner and
Luckett note that
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See Pozdena, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that riskier households “will self-select into using the credit
feature of their cards because, for them, the rate premium is attractive given the costs to them of alternative
credit”).
90
Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 663 (discussing 1986 study by Payments Services, Inc.).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 665 (“On the demand side, credit card users have tended to be relatively insensitive to interest rate
levels in their decision to acquire or to keep a particular card. Consequently, card issuers have tended to
compete on factors other than price.”).
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Expecting to gain relatively little incremental volume from either new or existing
cardholders by lowering rates, issuers have had minimal economic incentive to
reduce rates to the broad spectrum of their cardholders (as opposed to selected
subsets of customers). Lowering the interest rate on standard card plans would
reduce interest revenue on balances of all existing cardholders who revolve their
accounts – customers who apparently were willing to pay the original rate.93
This feature distinguishes credit card loans from other types of consumer loans. For other types
of loans, such as auto loans, a lower interest rate is available only to new borrowers, thus there
is no loss of revenue on existing loans.94
Anecdotal evidence supports the intuition that larger revolvers will tend to invest more in
learning about competing interest rates and switching cards in response the information
gathered. In recent years, card issuers have made widespread use of introductory “teaser”
rates to induce card users to switch banks. “Teaser” rates offer rates much lower than the
prevailing market rate for an introductory period of 6 to 18 months, encouraging consumers to
transfer balances to the new card with the lower interest rate. While convenience users are
unlikely to respond to these offers, large revolvers follow them with more interest. In fact, large
revolvers have learned to “card surf” by jumping from one card to another, taking advantage of
the introductory rate but then switching to yet another card when the low-interest introductory
period ends. According to one report, credit card customers “are learning to jump from one
promotional low-interest-rate lender to the next, just like shopping for the lowest-priced tank of
gas.”95 One “card surfer” reports that he whittled down massive credit card debt by jumping
through the low “teaser” rates of five different cards. “I’m beating them at their own game,” he
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Id. at 664.
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Jeff Bailey & Scott Kilman, More Borrowers Appear to be Wising Up About Credit, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 1, 1998, at D5.
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triumphs.96 Credit card issuers express parallel frustration with their inability to keep these card
surfers “captured,” which requires them to “steal[ ] the same people over and over.”97 Savvy
credit card customers, observes one industry analyst, “pay off Peter with Paul – at a lower rate.
And by the time Paul wants a bigger payment, Jane comes around with a better offer.”98 Given
the low rates offered by these cards, it is difficult for banks to actually make profits from these
borrowers during the introductory period.99
Given the damnations of the bankruptcy community against credit card issuers for the
alleged abuse of maintaining “high” interest rates on credit cards, it is amusing to note that they
also condemn these low introductory interest rates.100 Apparently this criticism stems from the
idea that somehow credit card issuers “hook” new customers with these introductory rates into
taking on new debt obligations and then raise the rates later.101 It is not clear how credit card
issuers are supposed to appease their critics. While most critics complain that interest rates are
“too high,” others (and sometimes the same critics) simultaneously criticize them for offering
introductory rates that are “too low.” One is reminded of the plight of the fictional Tom Smith
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Id.
Id.
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Id. See also Jonathan D. Epstein, Credit Card Industry Turbulent, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE , May 24,
1999, available at 1999 WL 6968757 (“But the offers are going to an increasingly sophisticated potential
customer. Many consumers have mastered the art of flipping their balances from one teaser offer to
another, denying the issuers steady customers and hefty profits.”); id. (“‘It’s becoming increasingly
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to their advantage . . . . Just using a teaser rate is not enough. Otherwise, your customer will just leave at
the end of the teaser rate.’” (quoting industry analyst Moshe A. Orenbuch)).
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James J. Daly, Saving on Postage, CREDIT CARD M GMT ., May 1, 1997, at 68 [hereinafter Daly, Saving]
(“There is no way you can make profits in the bank card industry at a 5.9% interest rate . . . . You will be
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Bzezensky)).
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See, e.g., ROBERT L. JORDAN, ET AL ., BANKRUPTCY 208 (5th ed. 1999).
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Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, supra note 79, at 262-63; Bankruptcy Revision: Hearings on Bankruptcy
Reform and Financial Services Issues Before the Senate Comm. On Banking, 106th Cong. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Klein, Hearings] (testimony of Gary Klein, attorney for Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.).
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and his incredible bread machine, “Price too high? Or price too low?/Now, which charge did
they make?/Well, they weren’t loath to charging both/With Public Good at stake!”102
A recent survey found that roughly 60% of Visa and MasterCard issuers offer low
introductory rates,103 and these introductory rates are highly touted in solicitation mailings.104 As
predicted by economic theory, the clear target of these solicitations are large revolvers – the
group most likely to be responsive to changes in interest rates. In short, issuers have managed
to make these lower rates available to the parties most interested in them, while retaining higher
rates for those who do not care about their interest rates. Both patterns are consistent with
rational consumer behavior.105 Similarly, credit card issuers are increasingly distinguishing their
customers based on risk characteristics, offering lower interest rates to a select group of lowerrisk customers with good payment records, while retaining higher interest rates for higher-risk,
late-paying customers.106
Thus, it is doubtful that the failure of consumers to change credit cards on the basis of
changes in interest rates really provides sound evidence of consumer irrationality. Instead,
consumers exhibit highly rational behavior in this area. Most cardholders gain little or no benefit
from a reduction in interest rates because they revolved little or no balance. For these
cardholders almost any cost of switching or loss of existing benefits from switching will exceed
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R. W. Grant, Tom Smith and His Incredible Bread Machine, reprinted in THE INCREDIBLE BREAD
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the gains from switching. By contrast, larger revolvers who would benefit from a reduction in
interest rates do in fact seek out cards that offer that benefit and choose accordingly. For them,
the benefits of switching for a better interest rates are larger. In short, once Ausubel’s mistaken
use of interest rates as the sole measure of consumer rationality is corrected in favor of a more
realistic analysis, consumers readily reveal themselves as highly rational.

2.

Rearranging Intertemporal Consumption Streams

As to the claim that consumers should “rearrange their intertemporal stream of
consumption” as a response to “high” interest rates, Ausubel again commits the fallacy of
applying an absolute standard to a relative comparison. Here the relevant inquiry is the
comparative rate at which the individual prefers to consume today rather than at a later date.
This comparison will include such things as the likelihood of increased income in the future (the
life-cycle hypothesis) and the durability or capital nature of the goods purchased, such that they
can be seen as an investment that will save money over the long run.107 As Christopher DeMuth
observes:

Decisions to finance current consumption out of future earnings are not
fundamentally different from other economic decisions; most decisions are not
simple trade-offs between goods at one point in time, but are trade-offs
between present and future consumption and/or present and future production.
Personal borrowing, investment, and spending decisions follow patterns that are
consistent and rational.108
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Ausubel provides no evidence as to the endogeneity of individual preferences for inter-temporal
consumption or as to why credit card interest rates are “high” in light of this trade-off between
current and future consumption.

3.

Conclusion

In short, characterizing credit card interest rates as “high” or “expensive” appears to be
little more than ipse dixit – credit card interest rates are just “high” in the opinion of some
observers according to some absolute standard, that they alone seem to know. 109

III. Has Competition Failed in the Credit Card Industry?
Ausubel also argues that a failure of competition in the credit card industry means that
credit card rates are “high” relative to what they “should” be in a competitive market. Ausubel
posits (without any support) that the “cost of funds is obviously the primary determinant of the
marginal cost of lending via credit cards, and it is usually the only component of marginal cost
that varies widely from quarter to quarter.”110 Ausubel also observes (with support) that from
1982 to 1989, the cost of funds rate fluctuated roughly between 6-15% and generally declined
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Though I may be belaboring a somewhat obvious point, numerous members of the bankruptcy
community have made the same error of describing credit card interest rates in above terms. For instance,
Bankruptcy Judge David F. Snow has recently stated, “Although the competition among card issuers has
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from 15% at the beginning of the period to below 10% at the end of the period. During this
same period, by contrast, credit card interest rates remained relatively constant at approximately
18%. From this comparison Ausubel draws two conclusions: first, that credit card interest rates
are “sticky” and relatively unresponsive to changes in federal funds rates; and second, that credit
card interest rates are sticky at “high” rates of interest, suggesting a lack of issuer competition
and the presence of consumer irrationality in the credit card market.111 Although the proposition
of “sticky” credit card interest rates is largely incorrect, it does contain a grain of truth. By
contrast, the proposition that interest rates are sticky at “high” rates of interest is completely
incorrect.
Ausubel and others also argue that as a result of this absence of adequate competition,
credit card operations have earned persistent supranormal returns over a long period of time
and that these profits have led credit card issuers to extend credit recklessly in the pursuit of
ever-larger profits. This claim of failure of competition in the credit card market is a necessary
condition that critics of the credit card industry must be able to support if their criticisms are to
stand. Persistent profits are possible only if the credit card industry is proven to be largely
noncompetitive. In turn, the presence of persistent profits is a necessary condition for making
the claim that credit card issuers have extended credit “recklessly” and the related claims that
credit card issuers only have themselves to blame for increasing bankruptcy losses. Moreover,
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if the credit card market is largely competitive, then bankruptcy losses will tend to have the
negative efficiency effect of passing on these losses to consumers, rather than being primarily a
wealth transfer from credit card issuers to consumers in the form of reductions in these profits.
This suggests that there are two possible scenarios to describe the operations of the
credit card market. One model posits that the credit card market is competitive and that
consumers are rational. The alternative model is that market is fundamentally noncompetitive
and that consumers are fundamentally irrational in their credit card use. As the following
discussion will demonstrate, the argument that competition has failed in the credit card market is
facially implausible and empirically doubtful.

A. Are Credit Card Interest Rates “Sticky”?
There is some truth in the observation that credit card interest rates are sticky.
Unfortunately for the foes of credit cards, this observation tends to undercut rather than
support their claims of consumer irrationality and supranormal industry returns.
As noted, the cornerstone of the argument that credit card interest rates are sticky is the
observation that during the period 1982-1989 interest rates on credit cards remained relatively
constant, even as the cost of funds rate fell significantly.112 From this observed stickiness, it is
concluded that rapacious credit card issuers are reaping huge profits by shearing gullible
consumers. While the factual observation is somewhat correct, the conclusion is absolutely
incorrect.
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The error in the conclusion is evidenced by a more thorough examination of all of the
relevant data, rather than the small and arbitrary sample period. Table 1 presents data on
changes in credit card interest rates from 1972 to 1989 and compares them to interest rates on
two other forms of consumer credit, automobile loans and personal loans.113 As the data
shows, throughout this entire period credit card interest rates have been far more “sticky” than
these other forms of consumer credit.
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Table 1: U.S. Consumer Credit Commercial Bank Rates, 1972-1989
Source: SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA , A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 427, tbl. 58 (3d
ed. 1991).

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

New Automobiles
(36-48 months)
10.05
10.21
10.97
11.36
11.07
10.92
11.02
12.02

% Yield
Personal Loans
(24 months)
12.46
12.60
12.99
13.08
12.77
12.97
13.19
13.85

8-year average

10.95

12.99

17.10

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

14.30
16.54
16.83
13.92
13.71
12.91
11.33
10.46
10.85
12.07

15.47
18.09
18.65
16.88
16.47
15.94
14.82
14.23
14.68
15.44

17.31
17.78
18.51
18.78
18.77
18.69
18.26
17.93
17.78
18.02

10-year average

13.29

16.07

18.18

Year

Credit Card Plans
17.21
17.21
17.21
17.16
17.05
16.89
17.03
17.03

The conclusion is strongly reinforced by a graphical representation of the same data.
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Chart 1: U.S. Consumer Commercial Bank Rates, 1972-1989114
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Examining Table 1, it is evident that Ausubel is correct about the stickiness of interest
rates in the period from 1982-1989. Perhaps more striking is that interest rates on credit cards
were equally sticky throughout the entire period of 1972-1989. The era of the 1970s, of
course, was an era of dramatically increasing interest rates – essentially the mirror opposite of
the falling interest rates of the 1980s, as shown in Table 2.115
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Data derived from Table 1.
HOMER & SYLLA, at 388-89 tbl.52.
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Table 2: Federal Funds Rate, 1970-1989
Source: SIDNEY HOMER AND RICHARD SYLLA , A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 388-89 tbl.
52 (3d ed. 1991).

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Federal Funds
Annual Average
7.18
4.66
4.43
8.73
10.50
5.82
5.04
5.54
7.93
11.19
13.36
16.38
12.26
9.09
10.23
8.10
6.80
6.66
7.57
9.21

Federal Funds
Low
4.90
3.71
3.29
5.94
8.53
5.20
4.65
4.61
6.70
10.01
9.03
12.37
8.95
8.51
8.38
7.53
5.85
6.10
6.58
8.45

Monthly Average
High
8.98
5.57
5.33
10.78
12.92
7.13
5.29
6.56
10.03
13.78
18.90
19.10
14.94
9.56
11.64
8.58
8.14
7.29
8.76
9.85

The fluctuation in average interest rates over this period is also represented in Chart 2.
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Chart 2: Federal Funds Interest Rate, 1970-1989116
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As Table 2 identifies, during the period 1972-1982, the federal funds rate rose form a
low of 3.29% to a high of 19.10%. Annual averages ranged from 4.43% in 1972, steadily
increasing to 16.38% in 1982, before they started falling again. By beginning his examination in
1982 Ausubel has essentially chosen the height of the massive interest rates increases of the
1970s and 1980s as his benchmark, and focused on only the downward trend in the cost of
funds from 1982-1989. It is not defensible to simply choose a short and arbitrary time period
and ignore the periods that came before and after.117
What is significant upon examining Table 1 and Table 2 together, therefore, is that the
stickiness of credit card interest rates is not a phenomena of the post-1982 period. Instead, it is
evident that credit card interest rates were also sticky during the 1970s and early-1980s despite
a rising cost of funds rate. Regardless of whether the cost of funds rate is rising or falling, for a
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Data derived from Table 2.
See Canner & Fergus, supra note 4, at 2 (“Thus, the more reliable indicator of long-run bank card
profitability seems to be an average derived from periods of low as well as high profitability rather than from
the atypical experience of recent years.”).
117
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period of 20 years the interest rate on credit cards has remained relatively constant, until the
decline in interest rates in recent years.118 Thus, if credit card issuers were reaping large profits
off the “spread” between the cost of funds and interest rates in the 1980s, they were suffering
equally large losses during the 1970s and the early 1980s.119 In fact, during this period, the
average return on credit card operations was lower than for other sectors of banking activity. 120
As Homer and Sylla conclude regarding this period, “[c]redit card plan rates . . . on average
moved barely at all in relation to other rates during a period that witnessed the greatest
fluctuations in money and bond market rates in U.S. history.”121 Although it may be possible to
argue that state usury ceilings limited maximum credit card interest rates as the cost of funds
rose, usury restrictions cannot explain why credit card interest rates were not lower at the
beginning of the period when the cost of funds was much lower, nor why credit interest rates did
not rise in the post-Marquette period 1978-1982.
This historical stability in credit card interest rates has actually cracked in recent years,
as credit card interest rates have steadily declined in recent years. As Table 3 indicates, shortly
after the closing period of Ausubel’s initial study, credit card interest rates began a steady
downward trend that has resulted in significantly lower interest rates on credit cards.122
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PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72, at 4-5 (“Data . . . indicate[s] that credit card interest rates fell sharply
from mid-1991 through early 1994 after being relatively stable for most of the previous twenty years. Since
early 1994, credit card interest rates have fluctuated in a narrow range between 15.13 and 16.25 percent.”).
119
M ANDELL, supra note 4, at xix (“From 1979 to 1981, as the cost of money skyrocketed during the
inflationary Carter years, the banks actually lost money on their credit cards.”).
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See Canner & Fergus, supra note 4.
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HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 113, at 427.
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PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 70, at 5 tbl.2. See also Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 665 (“In the
past several months, however, much of the rigidity in credit card pricing has been breaking down, with a
growing number of issuers reducing rates 2 to 4 percentage points.”).
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Table 3: Credit Card Interest Rates, 1972-1998
Source: FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 4 tbl.2 (June 1999) (“Average Most Common Interest Rate on
Credit Card Plans, 1972-August 1994, and the Interest Rate Assessed on Accounts Incurring
Interest Charges, November 1994-1998”).
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Average Most Common Interest Rate
17.21
17.21
17.21
17.16
17.05
16.89
17.03
17.03
17.31
17.78
18.51
18.78
18.77
18.69
18.26
17.93
17.78
18.02
18.17
18.23
17.78
16.83
15.77
15.79
15.50
15.57
15.63

Again, the graphical representation of this data is striking, as shown in Chart 3:
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Chart 3: Credit Card Interest Rates, 1981-1998
Data derived from Table 3
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In the brief period from 1992 to 1994, credit card interest rates fell from 18.23% to
15.77%, a drop of almost 2.5 percentage points, and a 15% fall in interest rates in a short
period of time.123 This drop appears to be responsive to competition and consumer demand.
Before the early 1990s, credit card competition consisted of waiving annual fees and providing
credit card program enhancements, thereby attracting primarily convenience users of credit
cards.124 This year, several large issuers made available permanent interest of 9.9% to the
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PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 70, at 4. Some have tried to argue that this rapid fall can be attributed
to a response to threats of regulation by the federal government. This theory is implausible for at least three
reasons. First, is suggests an implausible degree of coordination among the thousands of issuers of credit
cards to all cut their rates simultaneously. Such coordination is implausible, given the free rider and
collective action problems associated with such a hypothesis. Put simply, a unilateral decision by any bank
to cut interest rates in response to threats of regulation below what they could charge would reduce their
profits relative to banks that did not cut their rates. Second, since that time interest rates have remained
relatively stable at the new lower rate of 15-16%. Just as it would be in the interest of any individual lender
not to cut rates in response to regulatory threats, lenders would have an incentive to “cheat” and raise rates
in periods after the regulatory threat has subsided. This has not occurred. Finally, the theory lacks
empirical credibility. As Canner and Luckett observe, two similar bills to reduce credit card interest rates
were proposed in 1986, but they had no effect on credit card interest rates. Canner & Luckett, supra note 26,
at 666.
124
See PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72 at 3; Baxter, supra note 70, at 1017.
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most creditworthy cardholders, with no annual fee and no balance-transfer requirement.125
One industry report concludes that, “consumers are the winners in this latest interest-rate
battle.”126 There is also a growing trend toward adjustable-rate cards with interest-rates that
move with changes in the prime or other available rate.127
Thus, Ausubel is modestly correct in his observation that credit card interest rates have
remained relatively stable, even though the cost of funds for credit card issuers have fluctuated
over time. But his conclusion that this proves consumer irrationality and provides the basis for
large issuer profits is faulty – credit card interest rates remained relatively stable even when the
cost of funds rose as precipitously in the period prior to that studied by Ausubel. And interest
rates have fallen and remained significantly lower in the period since Ausubel’s study closed.
But the inference of consumer irrationality and large issuer profits is faulty on another
score. Ausubel expects that changes in funding costs will be directly reflected in changes in
consumer interest rates. This conclusion is incorrect. First, as suggested above, a decrease in
supply costs may be passed on to consumers in a variety of forms, not just interest rates. Most
notably, credit card issuers have substantially increased the services and benefits associated with
credit cards, a number of which have already been detailed.128 This includes such things as cobranding and other benefits. Second, cost reductions need not be reflected only in interest rate
reductions. Issuers can extend consumer grace periods, allowing the consumer to carry an
open account for a longer period of time without incurring finance charges. Perhaps the most
important innovation was the rapid decline in the use of annual fees for standard credit cards
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Burney Simpson, She’s Real Fine, My 9.9, CREDIT CARD M GMT ., Oct. 1, 1998, at 96.
Id.
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over the past several years.129 The elimination of annual fees, which used to be as much as
$30-$50, is equivalent to a massive across-the-board rate reduction. Recalling that most credit
card holders are convenience users, and likely to be indifferent to interest rate reductions,
eliminating annual fees is likely to be far more attractive to the average credit card user. The
hostility of consumers to annual fees is evidenced by the fact that when annual fees were first
imposed, consumers canceled over nine million bank cards in 1980, amounting to some 8% of
the outstanding total.130 Thus, any discussion of the pass through of cost savings in recent years
must also keep in mind the virtual elimination of annual fees. A myopic focus on interest rates
alone ignores this fundamental change in the credit card market and fails to consider the full
benefits and costs of using credit cards.131
As the cost of funds fell during the 1980s, issuers responded in a manner consistent with
expressed consumer demand:

Prior to the early 1990s, card issuers competed primarily by waiving annual fees
and providing credit card program enhancements. Since then, however,
interest-rate competition has played a much more prominent role. Many credit
card issuers, including nearly all of the largest issuers, have lowered interest
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See AUSUBEL, REVISITED, supra note 111, at 19.
See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
129
See PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72, at 3 n.7 (noting that the proportion of credit card issuers
reporting they do not assess an annual fee on their largest credit card plan increased from 47% on January
31, 1996 to 54% a year later); EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at 82-83 (noting large drop in “real
annual fees” from 1984 to 1992); Epstein, supra note 98 (noting that “as competition heated up, issuers were
forced to all but eliminate the annual fees”); AUSUBEL, REVISITED, supra note 111, at 28-29.. Consumers
will pay an annual fee in exchange for particular services, such as frequent-flyer miles, that are linked to the
fee, but not for a plain-vanilla card; The Latest Word About Annual Fees, CREDIT CARD M GMT ., Sept. 1,
1998, at 12.
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M ANDELL, supra note 4, at 78.
131
Ausubel discusses the elimination of annual fees, but doesn’t seem to recognize that the reduction in
annual fees should be best understood as a de facto interest rate reduction. See Auaubel, Revisited, supra
note 111.
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rates on many of their accounts below the 18 to 19 percent levels commonly
maintained through most of the 1980s and early 1990s.132
Rather than a failure of competition, therefore, the 1980s can be seen as a era of high
competitive responsiveness to expressed consumer demand. As Raskovich and Froeb
observe, the fact that credit card interest rates are less responsive to changes in the cost-offunds rate also explains the seeming anomaly that consumer default rates on credit cards actually
rise during periods when the cost-of-funds for issuers are falling, and vice-versa.133 When the
cost of funds rate falls, at the margin consumers will tend to make greater use of forms of credit
that are more responsive to changes in the cost of funds, such as car loans, home equity loans,
and the like. As a result, consumers who have many credit options will tend to turn away from
credit cards and into these other forms of credit. This means that those who continue to use
credit cards during this period will tend to be higher-risk borrowers who have fewer credit
options. Higher-risk borrowers, therefore, will comprise a higher percentage of credit card
borrowers in periods of falling cost-of-funds rates. As a result, default rates would be expected
to rise. Rising default rates, in turn, will raise costs, partially offsetting the cost savings generated
by falling cost-of-funds rates. By contrast, if the cost-of-funds rate rises, low-risk borrowers
will shift away from more responsive credit vehicles at the margin, credit card defaults will tend
to fall, offsetting the upward pressures on credit card interest rates. Thus, the pattern of credit
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PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72, at 3.
RASKOVICH & FROEB, supra note 70, at 7-9. Raskovich and Froeb observe that in the third quarter of
1984, when the cost of funds was 10.71% the default rate was 3.05% of outstanding credit card balances. In
the third quarter of 1986, the cost of funds had fallen to 5.60% and the default rate had risen to 4.68%. As
the cost of funds rose to 7.59% in the third quarter of 1988 the default rate slipped back to 3.26%. Id.
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card use by rational consumers again helps to explain the seeming stickiness of credit card
interest rates in the face of changing cost-of-funds rates.134

B. Are Credit Card Interest Rates “High”?
But Ausubel does not only argue that credit card interest rates are sticky, he also argues
that they are sticky at “high” rates. His argument rests on the claim that credit card interest rates
should move in tandem with the cost-of-funds rate and that the failure of interest rates to drop
when the cost of funds did in the post-1982 period evidences that credit card issuers were
reaping huge profits. Examined from the standpoint of the cost of funds, therefore, Ausubel
concludes that credit card interest rates are stuck at rates “higher” than they would be in a
competitive market. This argument is incorrect in that it fails to recognize cost aspects of credit
card operations that distinguish them from other forms of consumer credit.
As noted previously, it has been a long-standing regularity of the credit-card market that
changes in credit card interest rates seem to be relatively immune to changes in the underlying
cost of funds. This is partly because of the indifference of most credit card users to interest
rates as opposed to other benefits offered by credit cards, because low interest rates cause a
substitution to other forms of credit, and because most consumers have evidenced a desire that
cost reductions be given in the form of longer grace periods and elimination of annual fees,
rather than lower interest rates. Thus, much of the stability of credit card interest rates is the
result of consumer demand patterns that put a very low premium on interest rate reductions.
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Id.; see also Baxter, supra note 70, at 1017.
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But there is an important supply-side dynamic to credit card operations that explains the
stickiness of interest rates. Two factors are relevant and distinguish credit card operations from
other forms of consumer credit. First is the fact that the cost of funds are a much smaller
component of credit card costs than for other forms of credit and thus credit card interest rates
should be less responsive to changes in the cost of funds than other forms of consumer lending.
Second are the higher risks associated with credit card operations relative to other forms of
credit.

1.

Costs of Credit Card Operations

Recall Ausubel’s unsupported statement that the “cost of funds is obviously the primary
determinant of the marginal cost of lending via credit cards.”135 This is incorrect as the cost of
funds plays a much smaller role in determining credit card interest rates than for other forms of
consumer credit. Thus, credit card interest rates should be expected to be less responsive to
changes in the cost of funds than alternative forms of consumer credit.
Credit cards loans are distinguishable from other forms of consumer loans by the
amount of costs imposed by sources other than the cost of funds. Credit card operations
require the lender to process a large volume of relatively small transactions and to service a
large number of accounts. Moreover, not only are there a larger number of accounts, but the
servicing of those accounts is much more intensive than for other forms of lending. For instance,
when a bank grants a car loan or a mortgage, most of the administrative costs are incurred in the
short period immediately prior to granting the loan. Moreover, the consumer bears many of the
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costs associated with the loan application and approval process, such as a credit check and
application fee. Assuming that the loan performs, post-lending administration is largely a
mechanical application of payments to accounts, a routine and low-intensity job.
By contrast, credit card operations require ongoing maintenance, including the
maintenance of permanent customer service and merchant service operations, fraud protection
and account administration.136 Because of these unique features of credit card lending,
operating costs tend to comprise a much larger element of the cost of running credit card
operations than for other forms of consumer credit. Moreover, it is doubtful that consumers
would often be willing to bear many of these costs as they do with home mortgages and car
loans.
Thus, for credit card issuers “[o]perating costs (including such diverse activities as
servicing accounts, soliciting new customers, and processing merchant credit card receipts)
accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total cost, and the cost of funds [only] 27 percent.”137
This split between the cost of funds and other elements of credit card costs distinguishes credit
card operations from other forms of consumer lending:138

Overall costs for mortgage, commercial, and installment loans totaled
between 8 percent and 10 percent of outstanding balances. Operating
expenses for these products amounted to 1.4 percent to 3.4 percent of
135

Ausubel, Failure of Competition, supra note 4, at 53.
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 7, at xi (noting that the principal balance of a credit card account
constantly changes as new charges and payments roll in, making credit card debt more costly to administer
than other forms of debt).
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Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 658; see also Baxter, supra note 70, at 1016 (“[T]he cost of funds for
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with sixty to eighty percent of total costs for other types of bank lending) . . . .”).
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outstanding balances and accounted for between 18 percent and 33
percent of total costs. The cost of funds, on the other hand, account for
60 percent of total expenses for installment lending, about 70 percent
for commercial lending, and nearly 80 percent for mortgage lending.139
As a result of this marked difference in cost structure, credit card interest rates would
be expected to be much less responsive to changes in cost-of-funds rates than other forms of
consumer lending, such as personal loans, car loans, and mortgages.140 Rates on other forms of
consumer lending tend to rise and fall in conjunction with changes in the cost of funds, but credit
card interest rates remain relatively unaffected by changes in interest rates because the cost of
funds is such a small part of the overall costs.141 As Homer and Sylla observe, consumer
interest rates “contain large cost components that do not vary much, even as open market rates
swing up and down. This is an important part of the explanation of why consumer credit rates
are both higher and more stable over time than market rates.”142 The larger the ratio of these
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Canner & Luckett, supra note 26, at 658; see also id. at 657 (“[T]he cost of funds is a relatively less
important component of the total cost of credit card operations than it is for other types of credit.”);
RASKOVICH & FROEB, supra note 70, at 5 (noting that a 100-basis-point increase in the credit card cost of
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in mobile home loan rates).
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conforms in general to the pattern of money and bond market rates over this period, but these rates behave
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rates in U.S. history.”).
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Id. at 428; see also DeMuth, supra note 36, at 228 (“Processing, debt-collection, bad-debt losses, and
other administrative costs incurred in providing consumer credit vary only slightly with the amount of the
loan; the costs of processing a $500 loan are little different from those of a $2,000 loan. For this reason,
interest rates (price as a percentage of the amount of the loan) must be higher for smaller loans in order to
cover costs.”); James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 A RIZ. ST . L.J. 61,
89 (1981) (”Administrative costs, however, are not directly related to loan size; it costs nearly as much to do
the paper work on a $100 loan as on a $100,000 loan. . . . Thus, small loans are more costly to make and
require a higher rate of interest.”).
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fixed cost components is to the cost of funds, the more resistant interest rates will be to changes
in the cost of funds.143
Nor is this regularity a unique feature of credit cards. Interest rates on small loans of
shorter duration have always been higher than longer-term, higher-value loans, primarily
because of the need to recoup the costs associated with granting and servicing the loan. Thus,
credit card interest rates are no more sticky than the rates on other commercial loans, once
adjustments are made for differences in loan default rates.144 Even in the Middle Ages the
interest rates charged by pawnshops (including publicly endowed pawnshops) were much
higher than interest rates charged on long-term loans secured by farms or estates.145 Of course,
both pawn shop loans and mortgages were secured in nature, so the difference in interest rates
cannot be explained by differences in risk. Rather, short-term consumer loans were more costly
to service relative to the dollar value of the loan than larger long-term loans. Homer and Sylla
observe that during the Middle Ages, “[t]he reason for the higher rates [on pawnshop loans]
was not primarily that the risk of making short loans on valuable security was greater than the
risk of making long-term loans on homes, but rather that the cost of making many small short
loans was very large.”146
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For instance, if the cost of funds is 90% of the lender’s costs, a 1% drop in the cost of funds should be
reflected in roughly a 90-basis-point drop in lending interest rates. By contrast, if the cost of funds is only
25% of the lender’s cost, then a 1% fall in the cost of funds would reduce the lending rates only 25 basis
points.
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RASKOVICH & FROEB, supra note 70, at 6-11.
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HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 113, at 424-25.
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Id. at 425.
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2.

Higher Risks of Credit Card Operations

Credit cards are also riskier than alternative forms of consumer credit for two reasons.
First, the problems of adverse selection and post-contractual opportunism means that credit
card issuers will have to assume that each borrower is high-risk (until proven otherwise) and
thus will be forced to charge the highest possible interest rate to all borrowers. Because interest
rates will be set according to this “worst case” scenario, they will be constrained less by the cost
of funds than be constraints on borrower opportunism. Second, the unsecured nature and lowdollar value of credit card loans makes the risk of non-collection in light of default very high
because it will generally not be cost-feasible to pursue collection action in most cases. These
costs will be basically constant for most credit card loans, and thus also will be unaffected by
changes in the cost of funds.

a)

Moral Hazard and Post-Contractual Opportunism

Credit cards also present unique problems of adverse selection and post-contractual
opportunism that tend to keep interest rates on credit cards at levels higher than for other forms
of credit. Under the typical installment consumer loan or mortgage, the lender lends a certain
amount of money based on the characteristics of the borrower, and the borrower then pays
down that balance over time. Late payments and other payment problems can trigger defaults
and, where the loan is secured, repossession of collateral.
Credit cards differ from the typical installment loan transaction in that the borrower is
approved for a line of credit that he can draw against. At the time the loan is made, it is difficult
for the card issuer to determine whether the borrower will turn out to be a good or bad risk, a
63

low-risk timely payer or a high-risk late payer. Confronted with the difficulty of making this
determination, a rational lender would be forced to assume that all borrowers fall in the high-risk
category, and will be charged a high interest rate.147 In return, there is no way for low-risk
borrowers to accurately signal their reliability to lenders, because it is too easy for high-risk
individuals to disguise themselves as low-risk.148 As a result, it would be irrational for a bank to
assume that a borrower is low-risk, because there is no reliable way to ensure that the borrower
will retain that status.
Once the loan is extended the threat of post-contractual opportunism is high, because
once the borrower is extended credit, the creditor retains little ability to control the borrower’s
subsequent behavior.149 Indeed, the incentive of the borrower to engage in post-contractual
opportunism will be greatest as the riskiness of the loan increases, such as when the borrowers
net worth is impaired or when his liquidity is low.150 This aspect of credit card lending is also
important in that it suggests a greater investment of resources in pre-screening and pre-approval
credit checks and the like will be able to do little to reduce this far more critical form of risk of
post-contractual opportunism. The post-contractual changes in circumstances that present the
largest risk are the same circumstances that the card issuer will be least able to guard against
when deciding to issue the credit card.
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See Pozdena, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the credit card lender must generally “assume ‘worst case’
exposure within each segment” of its borrowers).
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Given this risk of post-contractual opportunism and moral hazard, a rational lender will
“price the loan assuming maximum risk exposure.”151 Randall J. Pozdena notes that, “credit
card debt interest rates must be set very high in order to compensate the issuer for the fact that
users will adjust their risk in response to the price of the credit.”152 As a result, “lenders must
charge considerably higher credit card rates than when lending is secured, even to
‘creditworthy’ segments.”153
Thus, it is instructive that to the extent that credit card interest rates have fallen, they
have tended to fall selectively, rather than across the board.154 Offering lower rates to all would
create an adverse selection problem of attracting high-risk borrowers. Instead, issuers are
increasingly offering initial higher rates, but are reducing the interest rates for long-standing
customers who prove their reliability over time through their patterns of timely payments.155
Presumably this preferred status can be forfeited if the borrower moves from a low-risk profile
to a high-risk profile. It is predicted that these segmented rate structures linked to cardholder
riskiness will become increasingly widespread in the future.156 This does not change the
fundamental dynamic, however, that rational card issuers must assume unproven cardholders to
be high-risk borrowers until proven otherwise. Thus, generally stated interest rates are likely to
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remain high, even as proven low-risk customers increasingly receive better terms. But note that
this adverse selection problem does not dampen competition, it just leads to competition on
alternative margins.

b)

Other Factors Increasing Credit Card Risk

Other factors make it more difficult to recoup expenses associated with credit card
loans. For instance, bank installment loans often include extensive individual credit investigations
that are charged to the borrower as a flat fee to cover the cost of the credit investigation. 157
Credit card issuers do not have this option – there is little reason to believe that the average
consumer would be willing to pay $50 or more simply to enable the card issuer to perform a
credit check before applying for a credit card. Nor could the card issuer afford to pay this cost,
as the cardholder may never use the card and can cancel it at any time. In an attempt to
perform an adequate credit check and to keep costs down, credit card issuers have come to
rely increasingly on a concept called “credit scoring,” whereby a central clearinghouse
essentially performs a single credit check and converts the information into a standardized
format that will enable the prospective credit card issuer to get a rough-and-ready estimate of
the individual’s creditworthiness.158
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DeMuth, supra note 36, at 228.
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The problem of credit card riskiness is compounded by the difficulty of enforcing credit
card obligations in the case of default. Although there has been some development of secured
credit cards in recent years, most credit card debt is unsecured.159 The unsecured status of
credit card loans makes them riskier and more difficult to collect than secured consumer loans.
Where collateral is provided, an otherwise higher-risk borrower can reduce the creditor’s risk
of nonpayment upon default and signal his credit-worthiness, thereby reducing his interest rate.
Unsecured credit card lenders, however, cannot avail themselves of the debtor’s collateral, but
must instead pursue the debtor through collection remedies. Given the small value of most
credit card purchases and the consumptive nature of many of them (food, travel, and
entertainment) it is simply not feasible for the credit to take a security interest in most of the
things purchased with credit cards.160 Given the debtor’s relatively unfettered ability to file
bankruptcy and discharge this debt by paying little or none of it,161 credit card issuers will have
little ability to collect any judgment against the debtor. Moreover, given the hostility of many
judges to actions by credit card issuers to have credit card debts declared nondischargeable,
this theoretical avenue will rarely offer solace to the credit card issuer.162
These problems are further exacerbated by the fact that the amounts owed by debtors
to particular credit card issuers are often relatively small. Debtors often will owe several credit
issuers a few thousand dollars apiece, rather than owing one credit card issuer a large amount.
Again this distinguishes credit card loans from car loans and home equity loans or mortgages.
The fact that any one creditor often will be owed a relatively small amount of money makes it
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likely that the creditor will not find it cost-feasible to pursue the debtor for collection, as the
transaction costs of collecting, such as court costs and attorneys’ fees, will often make the
project infeasible. The uneconomic nature of collecting on many credit card defaults further
increases the risk of credit card lending. Although the credit card lender can use the threat of
impaired credit ratings as an ex ante device to reduce the incentives for debtor misbehavior,
threats to credit, impair the credit rating of a borrower who has already defaulted does not
assist in the actual recovery of outstanding balances.163 Thus, the risk of collecting on a default
for credit cards is high relative to other forms of credit.
The presence of these unique risks goes along way towards explaining the stickiness of
credit card interest rates and their indifference to changes in the cost of funds. Economist
Randall Pozdena built a model that incorporated these risks and found a very high correlation
between predicted and actual credit card interest rates from 1972 to 1991. As Pozdena
observes, “[t]he parameters of the underlying model are consistent with the representation of
credit card debt as costly-to-service, unsecured credit extended to relatively high-risk
borrowers. Specifically, the loan seems to be priced as if the lender perceived the debt as
poorly collateralized or costly to service, and the variance of the borrower’s net worth [i.e., risk
of post-contractual opportunism] as high.”164 Rejecting Ausubel’s hypothesis of borrower
irrationality, Pozdena concludes that “the high, and insensitive, credit card rates are consistent
with the pricing of risky credit in an atmosphere of moral hazard and costly collateralization or
service. The fact that credit card issuers that do offer lower rates do so only to more carefully
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selected consumer segments also is consistent with the risk management model employed
here.”165

C. Consumer Irrationality
Ausubel contends that a consumers are irrational, in that they routinely underestimate
their credit card balances. But like the other elements of Ausubel’s argument, the
“underestimation hypothesis” has also been shown to be incorrect.
It is difficult to imagine that Ausubel could be right that more than a trivial number of
credit card holders chronically underestimate how much they owe on their credit cards. It has
been observed:

The problem with this argument is that it depends on cardholders
persistently misperceiving their own behavior. Although it may be
reasonable to believe that many consumers first acquire a card with
erroneous expectations about their future payment habits, it is harder to
argue that they will in fact regularly revolve their balances and yet
maintain the assumption that they will not do so in the future. At some
point, it would seem, such cardholders might recognize their actual
payment patterns and seek out a low-rate card – if, that is, dollar
differences in interest costs were really large enough to matter to
them.166
Empirical evidence also tends to rebut Ausubel’s belief that credit card users are
uniquely irrational consumers. Cargill and Wendel conclude, for instance, that “households
currently anticipate whether credit cards will be used to obtain revolving credit, in contrast to

163

See Pozdena, supra note 4, at 2.
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Ausubel’s assertion of consumer irrationality.”167 Anecdotal evidence reinforces this view that
consumers are much more sophisticated and knowledgeable about their own finances than
Ausubel gives them credit for.168
Nor is it clear why this “certain peculiarity of cardholder psychology”169 should be
unique to credit card transactions. Why wouldn’t consumers also chronically underestimate
their monthly mortgage payments, car payments, or student loan payments?170 Why don’t these
same people chronically bounce checks in the belief that they have more money in their
checking accounts than they think they do? Why don’t they chronically underwithhold on their
taxes and pay penalties every year? Ausubel provides no explanation for why credit card
transactions are uniquely susceptible to these problems of underestimation, as opposed to all
these other situations where similar considerations apply. Indeed, he admits to remaining
troubled by the underestimation hypothesis.171

IV. Credit Card Profits
At the root of all of the discussion of consumer irrationality and the like is the belief that
credit card operations generate permanent profits, meaning supranormal returns above
competitive equilibrium. Under this view, regulation of credit card activity is believed to have no
negative efficiency effects, and just constitutes a wealth transfer from credit card issuers to credit
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card users. To the extent that credit card issuers compete in a competitive market, however,
regulation will upset competitive equilibrium, resulting in dead-weight efficiency losses that harm
issuers and consumers alike. Thus, this is the cornerstone of the attack on credit card issuers.
On investigation, however, the accusation that credit card issuers are reaping large profits also
turns out to be false.

A. Market Structure
1.

The Credit Card Market Is Structurally Competitive

The idea that credit card issuers could possibly be reaping permanent profits when
viewing competition in the credit card market is implausible on its face. As Brito and Hartley
phrase the burden on those seeking to prove this belief, “Several authors . . . have argued that
even though the market for bank credit cards is unregulated, has thousands of independent
firms, many of them recent entrants, and has millions of consumers, it nevertheless appears to be
noncompetitive.”172 Between 1988 and 1991, the number of companies issuing credit cards
grew from approximately 4,000 to 6,000.173 In August 1998, the Federal Reserve noted that,
“currently roughly 6,800 depository institutions issue VISA and MasterCard credit cards and
independently set the terms and conditions on their plans. Close to 10,000 other institutions act
as agents for card-issuing institutions.”174 And these figures do not even include large non-bank
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issuers, such as, American Express and Dean Witter (Discover Card), which are carried by
millions of other consumers. In addition, recent decades saw the entry into the credit card
market of powerful non-financial institutions, such as AT&T, General Electric, and General
Motors.175 Barriers to entry into the credit card business are extremely low176 and issuers are
atomistically competitive.177 Admission to the Visa and MasterCard networks is extremely
inexpensive.178 Given the large number of atomistic competitors and the low barriers to entry,
the credit card industry appears to be as close a representation to a perfectly competitive
market as one could possibly imagine.179 As a result, any monopoly rents would be expected to
be readily competed away by existing and new entrants into the market.180
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Nonetheless, some commentators continue to insist that monopoly rents are present in
the credit card market.181 How this can be so is rarely explained, it is simply asserted as
accepted fact and deplored. Upon scrutiny, however, both the factual and theoretical bases for
this view breaks down.

2.

Entry Has Dissipated Any Profits

Consider first the factual assertion that credit card issuers are reaping huge and
permanent profits from their operations, thereby evidencing a lack of competition in the credit
card market.182 This conclusion is riddled with errors.
It is possible that credit card issuers earned some profits during the early 1980s, as
consumer demand for credit cards exploded while credit card costs fell. 183 Under conditions of
falling supply costs and dramatically increased demand, profits may be available for some
period of time. But these profits also encouraged entry into the credit card industry by new
issuers, competing away those profits. As Diane Ellis summarizes the situation, “[t]he
opportunity to earn high profits has attracted intense competition, which appears to be eroding
some of the high profits earned in the 1990s . . . .”184 From 1993 to 1997, pre-tax returns on
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credit card operations by “credit card banks” were almost cut in half, falling from 4.06% to
2.13%.185 Stuart Feldstein of SMR Research similarly noted that from 1994 to 1996, “after-tax
profits as a percentage of average managed assets declined from 2.26% to 1.31%.”186 Returns
from credit card operations appear to have increased somewhat in 1999, partly as a result of
tightening lending standards and increased fees on delinquent cardholders, and partly as a onetime jump in profits from several large industry acquisitions of existing accounts from firms
exiting the industry.187 Other commentators have reported similarly moribund returns to the
industry in recent years.188 Thus, to the extent that accounting returns remain higher than other
sectors of banking activity, this difference has narrowed substantially. In his most recent article
(published in 1997), Ausubel updates his previous comparison of returns in the credit card
industry with those of the overall banking industry. 189 In Figure 7 of that article, Ausubel

time, following a decade of low profits. However, the high profits of the mid-1980s did not last for long. As
in any competitive industry, new businesses started chasing those profits, as did existing businesses.
Consequently, profits have fallen back since then.”).
185
PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72, at 3 tbl.1.
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FED. RESERVE BD., THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
3 (June 1999) [hereinafter PROFITABILITY 1999].; see also Zandi & Chen, supra note 78, at 11 (noting
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expensive way to acquire good accounts than being forced to go out and solicit new accounts with the
expense and risk associated with signing up new cardholders. See Steve Jordon, First National Seeks
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presents data from the period 1971-1993. Calling the evidence “fairly striking,” he reaffirms his
prior conclusion that credit card issuers are making large and permanent profits.190 Interestingly,
however, he presents data only until 1993 on credit card returns. This selective presentation is
intriguing in that his Figures 1-6 in the article present data all the way up to 1996, thereby
including the most recent data available when he published the article in 1997. Data for the later
years certainly must have been available to Ausubel when he constructed Figure 7 (just as for
Figures 1-6), yet he provides no explanation for why he chose to exclude that data from his
paper. Thus, the data he presents ends with the year 1993, the year of peak returns in the
credit card industry, and excludes the subsequent tumble in credit card profitability. He
provides no explanation for excluding the information that returns on assets dropped
significantly in the years following 1993.191

B. Accounting Returns Are Not Economic Profits
Most calculations of credit card profits also tend to overstate the profitability of credit
card operations.192 For instance, the Federal Reserve’s measurement only includes “credit card
banks,” which they define as commercial banks that have assets greater than $200 million, have
the bulk of their assets in consumer loans, and have 90% of their consumer lending in credit
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cards and related plans.193 In 1997, only thirty-six banks qualified as credit card banks under
this narrow definition and the institutions included in the survey change over time. This narrow
definition of “credit card banks” tends to overstate earnings in the credit card industry. Such a
narrow definition also excludes non-bank issuers, such as industry also-ran Discover Card,
which despite having established a considerable cardholder base has “operated solidly in the red
for most of its short history.”194
The accounting method used to measure profits from credit card operations also tends
to overstate the returns to the credit card sector of banking activities. The standard measure
that is used is return-on-assets, measured by accounting revenues minus costs divided by
outstanding balances. But credit card operations use many assets that are unique to credit card
operations and which do not count as capital assets under the standard measure. For instance,
heavy expenditures on marketing and advertising during the start-up phase of the business are
not classified as capital assets, even though they obviously produce a stream of revenue that is
consistent with thinking of them as capital assets.195 As a result, capital expenditures for credit
card operations tend to be underestimated, artificially inflating accounting profits.196
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More fundamentally, this narrow focus overstates credit card profits first by looking at
ex post rates of profit, rather than ex ante risk-adjusted profits, and second, by examining only
the most successful issuers in the market and ignoring the less-profitable market participants.

1.

Ex Ante v. Ex Post Profits and the Need for Risk Adjustment

Traditional measures of credit card profitability overstate credit card profits by using an
ex post analysis of credit card profitability, rather than an ex ante risk-adjusted measure.197
Credit card loans are inherently more risky than other forms of consumer credit because of their
unsecured nature and their small value, which makes collection lawsuits unfeasible in most
cases.198 As a result of this higher risk, credit card issuers maintain significantly higher than
average equity-to-asset and loan-loss-reserves-to-total-loan ratios than for other operations.199
The higher risk of credit card operations also makes the cost of capital for credit card
operations higher than for other forms of bank credit.200
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Looking at high ex post profits also obscures the fact that what is relevant should be
expected profits ex ante, which must be adjusted for riskiness.201 The higher risk associated
with credit card operations means that on average credit card issuers will have to receive a
higher return to bear this risk.202 As Lawrence Lindsey has noted:

The strong earning profiles of the credit card banks, and their
associated capital and reserve allocations, are reflections of the risks
associated with this form of lending. Higher risk and higher return go
hand-in-hand, and the higher capital and reserves associated with this
form of credit are required to balance the risk. Put another way,
lenders active in the credit card business are conscious of higher
potential loss rates and expect returns that will fully absorb these losses
and still provide an adequate profit margin.203
Risk is a gamble. Because of the generally robust economy in recent years, higher-risk
lending has turned out to be more profitable than lower-risk lending – after the fact.204
However, this does not alter the conclusion that these returns could have been much lower or
even negative, as they were throughout the late-1970s and early-1980s.205 For similar reasons,
returns on credit card activities also tend to be much more volatile than for other sectors of
banking activity.206 Thus, even if ex post returns have been higher than in other sectors of bank
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activity, this does not prove that ex ante risk-adjusted returns are supranormal. This volatility in
returns over time also increases the importance of reviewing a sufficiently long period of time to
determine the average return on credit card operations, rather than the small and
unrepresentative time period chosen by Ausubel for study.207 Once a reasonable time frame is
studied, it is evident that the “profitability of the credit card business is in line with that of other
bank lending activities” for the period from 1974-1993.208

2.

Traditional Measures Focus Only on Successful and Profitable
Issuers

This focus on ex post returns, combined with the small number of “credit card banks”
generally examined, also tends to overstate credit card profitability. Large credit card banks
have traditionally solicited more marginal credit risks than small banks and also charged higher
rates to compensate for holding this higher risk.209 Again, this means that if those accounts ex
post turn out to perform better than expected, then returns will also be higher than expected.210
Standard measurements have tended to overstate those profits by focusing on only the
largest and most-profitable issuers (ex post). It is evident that profits and losses have not been

variable than for other types of consumer lending and that the standard deviation of the rate of return is
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evenly distributed throughout the credit card industry. For instance, credit card activities have
tended to be less profitable for smaller issuers than for larger ones.211 Unable to compete
effectively, several major credit card issuers have curtailed their operations in recent years,212
including such industry giants as Wells Fargo213 and powerful non-bank entrants such as
AT&T.214 As one industry analyst observes:

The bank card industry seems to be dividing into a society of haves and
have-nots. On the one hand, there are the monoline credit card issuers
and a handful of card operations owned by large banks. Many of these
card programs reported profit increases of 20% or more in 1997
despite high chargeoffs and record consumer bankruptcies. On the
other hand are the great majority of card issuers that are experiencing
poor or mediocre returns.215
Industry analysts expect that as some of these weaker issuers exit the market, competition will
be increasingly fierce as the remaining firms “fight tooth and nail with each other for every
customer.”216 They add that, as a result of this fierce competition, profit margins have dropped
substantially and card issuers have continued to try to innovate to make their products more
attractive to customers than rival cards.217 Moreover, home equity loans have provided a
powerful competitive rival, drawing customers away from credit-cards and into tax deductible,
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lower-interest rate home equity loans.218 Thus, competitive pressures have also developed from
outside the credit card industry.

3.

Interbank Premia on Credit Card Sales Have Dissipated

Ausubel also claims that alleged premia on interbank sales of credit card accounts
evidences that even ex ante the market expects supranormal returns on credit card
operations.219 But this argument fails to account for the higher transaction costs associated with
credit card operations.220 Thus, the higher amounts paid on interbank sales of accounts
probably simply reflect the savings on transaction costs of the purchasing bank.221 Like profits
generally, the era studied by Ausubel also was an era of uniquely high premia on the prices paid
for credit card portfolios. Soon afterwards the prices of credit card portfolios “dropped
precipitously.”222
If it were true that credit card issuers had market power, then it would also be difficult
to explain why credit card issuers lost money in the 1970s and early-1980s when there were
significantly fewer card issuers and consumers presumably were less experienced with credit
card use.223 It could be that increased experience with credit cards have somehow made
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consumers dumber rather than smarter in their credit card use. Such an unusual thesis would
seem to be somewhat difficult to argue.

C. The Credit Card Market Is Dynamically Competitive
Even a cursory glance at the history of the credit card industry in recent years also
rebuts the idea that the industry is noncompetitive. The credit card industry has proven itself to
be one of the most dynamically competitive in the economy. Heated competition, mergers, and
entry of new firms (including many non-financial firms) has caused rapid changes in industry
structure and leadership. The Federal Reserve notes, “[o]ver the past several years,
competition has led to substantial shifts in market shares among the industry’s largest firms.”224
Indeed, in just a decade the entire structure of the industry has changed, reflecting robust
competition:

Issuers need look back no further than the onset of the 1990s for a
textbook case of such an occurrence. At the time, money center banks
were the dominant issuers, thanks to the resources brought on by their
size. Despite their power, they had become lethargic, charging interest
rates of 18.9% or 19.8% and $20 annual fees for plain-vanilla cards.
When the specialty card issuers, such as Household, AT&T, and First
USA, began shaking up the business with contrarian marketing
strategies that eliminated annual fees, slashed interest rates, and offered
cardholders rich rewards for using their cards, the money centers were
not creative enough to counter the assault on their domain.225
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This heated competition led to a precipitous loss of market share for many former goliaths of the
credit card industry, including such leading banks as Bank of America, Chase, and others. Of
the leading banks, only Citicorp “managed to hold its place in the standings, but its growth rate
in recent years has lagged that of the specialists.”226 In short, recent experience indicates that
the credit card industry is highly competitive and that industry leaders can hold their posts only
by responding to consumer demand, or they will be quickly displaced by others.227 In addition,
trade reports indicate that those who have prospered have done so through responsive
customer service and provisions of valuable co-branding and other ancillary benefits.

D. Are Consumer Search and Switch Costs High?
Ausubel claims that the low apparent barriers to entry do not guarantee that that the
credit card market will be sufficiently competitive nor that consumers will benefit from the
competition. He contends that consumer “switch costs” are high, meaning that it will be difficult
for new entrants to attract customers. According to Ausubel, a credit card firm can create a
base of “loyal customers” who will stick with them, even if better alternatives are available.
These customers can be exploited by the card issuer, enabling the issuer to reap supranormal
profits off them.228 This purported explanation for alleged profits in the credit card market also
appears to be incorrect.
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First, the structure of the credit card industry has undergone a dramatic transformation
in the past decade.229 New entry into the market has created a massive shake-up, as industry
leaders only a decade ago have fallen behind new entrants. In the past decade, most of these
gains in market share have come from inducing customers to change cards, rather than from
signing up new customers. Instead, it is almost certainly the case that new entrants have earned
market share by stealing customers from their old issuers. Moreover, many of these gains have
come through innovative marketing techniques, such as attractive co-branding benefits or low
introductory periods on interest rates, indicating that the new entrants are providing customers
with desired card features and that customers will readily change cards in response to such
offers.230
Nonetheless, Ausubel asserts that the “credit card industry is a business where both
search costs and switch costs are likely to be especially prevalent,”231 an assertion that he
repeats in his 1997 article.232 Ausubel offers five reasons for his belief that both search and
switch costs are likely to be high in the credit card market:

(a) the information cost of discovering which banks are offering lower
interest rates; (b) the cost of time, effort, and emotional energy in filling
out an application for a new card (and possibly getting rejected; (c) the
fact that the card fee is usually billed on an annual basis, so that if one
switches banks at the wrong time, one forgoes some money; (d) the
perception that one acquires a better credit rating or a higher credit limit
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See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text (discussing entry of major new credit card issuers who
have replaced traditional industry leaders).
230
PROFITABILITY 1998, supra note 72, at 3.
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Ausubel, Failure of Competition, supra note 4, at 69.
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Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, supra note 79, at 263.
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by holding the same bank’s card for a long time; and (e) the time lag
between applying for a card and receiving one.233
Perhaps this description of high switch costs was accurate in 1991, although it is questionable.
Even if it was accurate in 1991, it is especially dubious today. Indeed, it is apparent that to the
extent that these costs are high for consumers, much of the efforts of credit card marketers have
been aimed at trying to reduce them. In their quest to steal customers away from existing
issuers, new entrants have had built-in incentives to reduce these search and switch costs for the
customers that they seek. Consider each of these factors in turn.

1.

Information Costs

Ausubel states that there are high information costs associated with learning about
competitors’ lower interest rates. This claim is simply baffling. It has long been understood that
a primary purpose of advertising is to reduce consumers’ information costs.234 Credit card
companies sent out some 3.45 billion credit card solicitations in 1998 by direct mail on top of 3
billion in 1997, and 2.4 billion in 1996,235 not to mention amounts spent on telephone marketing,
print advertisements, and other promotional activities.236 Overall, credit card issuers spent
upwards of $550 million per year in 1993 and 1994, and surely that figure has continued to rise
since that time.237 Moreover, credit card customers seek and respond to information that they
find relevant. As noted earlier, convenience users choose their cards on the basis of no annual
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fees and for ancillary benefits, such as insurance and co-branding benefits. Larger revolvers, by
contrast, have evidenced an ability to seek out and act upon information regarding interest
rates.238 I personally receive several direct mailings per month from credit card companies, and
I am not alone, all of which either prominently display special interest rate offers or a special
affinity or co-branding offer.239 Indeed, the more common complaint seems to be that there is
too much advertising and direct mail by card issuers, not too little.
The credit card market is awash in information about credit card interest rates and
benefits. The large amounts spent on advertising and direct mail evidences the heated
competition of the credit card market, and the efforts to cannibalize existing market leaders by
inducing consumers to switch cards. These advertising expenditures are a clear attempt to
reduce the very information costs that Ausubel and others bemoan. 240 Credit card advertising
through direct mail also appears to be of unusually high quality, proving substantially greater
amounts of information than advertising for many other products such as automobiles, tennis
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shoes, soft drinks, or beer.241 Although issuers tout “prestige” cards, such as gold cards and
platinum cards, most of these so-called prestige cards also offer substantial benefits that are not
otherwise available, such as car rental insurance and higher credit lines. Thus, it appears that
card issuers are competing for customers primarily on the basis of their product quality, rather
than through image advertising that provides little direct information.242
Most of these advertising efforts are also aimed at existing credit card holders, rather
than new recipients. The credit card industry is saturated, and has been so for quite some
time.243 By 1984, already 71% of American families owned some type of credit card,244 and
that number has not grown substantially since that time.245 From 1970 to 1986, the proportion
of families owning a bank card grew from 16% to 55%.246 It is likely that every credit worthy
individual who wants a credit card already has at least one. Thus, the increase in credit card
ownership primarily has resulted from an increase in the number of cards held by existing card
holders, not from an increase in the number of individuals holding cards.247 In 1998, the
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87

average cardholder held 4.2 credit cards per person. 248 More intuitively, the standard offer to
transfer existing balances from an old card to a new card only makes sense if the consumer
actually owns an old card in the first place.249
In this saturated market, increases in market share by one issuer almost certainly are the
result of stealing customers from some other issuer. Card issuers are churning over the same
customers, and existing card holders are showing a willingness to switch in response to a better
offer.250 The comments of one credit card marketing consultant are illustrative of difficulties
faced by card issuers in attracting and retaining customers. “I call it vampire loyalty,” he says.
“The more the credit companies use promotional offers to draw customers in, the more loyal
they become to the promotion rather than the core product. On one level, the response rates
are good because of the churn effect, but because customers are vampires, loyalty remains low
because they just go to the next good offer.”251 For households that own more than one card,
of course, it should be very easy to switch card use to the card that offers the best terms.

phone company, she can simultaneously be the customer for several credit card companies. See Ausubel,
Credit Card Defaults, supra note 79, at 263.
248
PROFITABILITY 1999, supra note 187, at 5. Mandell notes that by the mid-1980s consumers already
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rate has fallen from 7.5% to 6.9%. Whither Balance Transfers? CREDIT CARD M GMT ., Apr. 1, 1999, at 14.
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In short, the attack on credit card issuers for their direct mail policies seems to make no
sense at all.252 Nonetheless, it seems that virtually every article on consumer bankruptcy
contains some notice of the large volume of direct mail sent annually by the credit card industry.
The credit card market has been saturated for many years and every credit worthy person who
wants a credit card already has one. Thus, the likely effect of credit card advertising is simply to
increase competition, increase consumer information, and redistribute credit card users among
various issuers, rather than increasing the pool of credit card users generally. For those who
already own a credit card, informative direct mail solicitations appear to have only one effect –
to benefit consumers by increasing competition in the credit card industry by reducing consumer
switch costs.253

2.

Fear of Rejection

Ausubel claims that a second factor that keeps search and switch costs high are the
costs of filling out an application for a new card and possibly being rejected.254 It is because
responding to direct-mail solicitations requires effort on the borrower’s part that yield rates for
direct mail solicitations are much lower than for other forms of marketing, such as telephone
solicitations.255 Despite this low yield rate, direct mail remains the most reliable way of obtaining
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information on the customer’s finances that will allow an issuer to decide whether to supply a
card, thus the additional expense and lower yield rate from direct mail is presumably warranted.
Direct mail is also thought to be the best way to make the detailed and complicated sales pitch
associated with credit cards.256 Moreover, many credit card applications are now “preapproved,” minimizing the risk of rejection to the customer and thereby giving the consumer the
incentive to pursue the application.257 Again, it appears that credit card issuers have reduced
the application costs of a credit card significantly. Indeed, the more common complaint is that
the convenience of direct mail solicitations and pre-approved status make it “too easy” to
receive a credit card today, rather than too difficult, as suggested by Ausubel.

3.

Billing of Annual Fees on an Annual Basis

Ausubel also points to the fact that annual fees are billed on an annual basis as a further
obstacle to switching to a better card. In the last decade, annual fees on credit cards have

solicitations fell to 1.3% in 1997, the lowest level ever tracked by Mail Monitor tracking service, and down
from 1.4% the previous year, with the drop attributable to the “clutter” of multiple competing offers by
issuers). At the symposium at which this article was presented, Judge Samuel L. Bufford argued that this
low yield rate could potentially act as a barrier for new market entrants, by making it costly to attract
customers. Of course, one alternative would be to simply purchase existing accounts from other card
issuers. That aside, Judge Bufford raises an intriguing thesis. While my intuition differs from his, I have
seen no empirical or anecdotal evidence, one way or the other, on this point. Consequently, I stand by the
consensus view that barriers to entry are low; however, I recognize the possibility that subsequent empirical
evidence may rebut this conclusion.
256
See supra note 241 (discussing advantages of direct mail).
257
Apparently the proliferation of pre-approved credit solicitations is the result of federal regulations that
forbids the provision of credit information to third parties without an individual’s consent, unless the
information is provided in connection with “firm offers of credit.” See AUSUBEL, ADVERSE SELECTION,
supra note 66, at 3.
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largely disappeared.258 Thus, the concern about losing money on an annual fee, is no longer a
concern for most credit card users.

4.

Advantages of Long-Term Card Ownership

Ausubel also argues that there is a perception that one acquires a better credit rating or
a higher credit limit by holding the same bank’s card for a long time. It may be the case that
when an individual switches to a new card in the short run he suffers some reduction in his credit
limit. Given that credit limits have generally risen in the past decade, however, it is open to
question whether this factor places much of a constraint on the decision to switch cards. One
suspects that for the large majority of card owners, this is not a factor. More likely, as
suggested earlier, a rational credit card owner will be reluctant to switch to an unproven card
issuer where the consumer has been generally pleased with the quality of the incumbent card.
But if the incumbent card is providing high-quality service, it is not clear that there is any welfare
loss from reluctance to switch to a new untested card issuer.

5.

Time Delays in Receiving a New Card

Finally, Ausubel claims that there is a time lag between applying for a card and receiving
one. Anyone who has applied for a credit card recently is well-aware that this time lag is almost
always quite short, a few weeks at most. Moreover, it is not clear that this is really much of a
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practical problem. Most card owners actually own two or more cards already. 259 As a result,
switching cards is as simple as taking one card out your wallet rather than another. When
combined with the elimination of annual fees on most cards, this means that the cost of carrying
a provisional card is effectively zero. For most credit card users, therefore, there is effectively
no time lag associated with switching cards, because they almost always have at least one other
card standing by to be used whenever desired. Thus, the short waiting period between applying
for and receiving a new card imposes small actual costs on the ability of consumers to switch
cards in response to a more attractive offer.

6.

Conclusion: Search and Switch Costs in the Credit Card Market
Are Low and Falling

In short, Ausubel’s armchair empirical claim that “both search costs and switch costs
are likely to be especially prevalent” lacks foundation. Indeed, new entrants into the market
have energetically and creatively acted to reduce these barriers so as to make it easier to attract
new customers. The search and switch costs of the credit card industry seem to be quite low
and have led to heated competition among issuers to try to steal customers away from their
rivals.260
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Ausubel relies on his belief in high search and switch costs as one of his explanations for
why competition has not eliminated economic rents to credit card issuers. His explanations for
why search and switch costs may be high have been shown to be wanting. Thus, he also lacks
a theoretical explanation for how the credit card market could be noncompetitive. In short, the
credit card industry is highly competitive and it is obvious that consumers have benefited mightily
from this competition.

E. Post-Mortem on the Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Industry and
Issuer Profitability
Reviewing the evidence, therefore, it is time to lay to rest the theses of consumer
irrationality, high profits, and the failure of competition in the credit card industry that fuel
Ausubel’s thesis. Each element of Ausubel’s argument has been questioned by more thorough
subsequent analysis and testing.261 He has presented suspect conclusions based on incomplete
and questionable data. Given the flaws in his analysis, and the almost uniform rejection of his
conclusions in subsequent studies, the widespread acceptance of his thesis in the bankruptcy
community may be little more than political wishful-thinking.262 It is time for the bankruptcy
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community to set aside this model of the credit card market and consumer rationality and
analyze these issues according to a full and unbiased assessment of the economics of credit
cards and the credit card market.
At root there are only two possible scenarios: either the credit card industry is
fundamentally competitive or it is fundamentally noncompetitive. In order to conclude that the
credit card industry is noncompetitive and that permanent profits are possible, several conditions
are necessary. On the issuer side, it is necessary to believe that an entire industry could be
noncompetitive despite the presence of 6,000 atomistic competitors, low barriers to entry,
actual entry by several extremely powerful companies (such as AT&T and General Motors),
and a large amount of fluctuation in the identities of the market leaders. On the consumer side, it
is necessary to believe that consumers irrationally underestimate their credit card balances
month after month and year after year, and that this irrationality is unique only to credit cards
and not to any other form of consumer credit. On the other hand, one could conclude that the
credit card market is actually as competitive as its market structure suggests, that ex post
accounting measures of profits are flawed measures of actual risk-adjusted profitability, and that
credit card use reflects rational consumer use given the alternatives available. Clearly the
competitive scenario is more plausible than the noncompetitive scenario. Given that the
presence of persistent profits is a necessary condition for acceptance of the critics’ case for the
culpability of credit card issuers in the bankruptcy boom, this would seem to cast fatal doubt on
their case.

search reveals a 10-1 count in favor of Ausubel’s articles versus those of all his critics combined. Such onesided citation numbers for Ausubel’s articles without even acknowledging the existence of his multiple
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V. Usury Regulations and the Misunderstood Role of Marquette
Starting from the assumption that the credit card market is noncompetitive and that
issuers reap large and permanent profits, members of the bankruptcy community have leaped to
the conclusion that the source of this mischief was the Supreme Court’s decision in 1978 in
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp.263 At that time, many states had
usury restrictions in place that limited the interest rates that could be charged on consumer loans,
including credit card operations. It was these limits on interest rates that were primarily
responsible for the losses suffered in the high-inflation, high-interest rate years of the 1970s.
Confronted with an inability to cover their costs, bank card issuers responded by retrenching
their operations and reducing their now-unprofitable credit card operations.
In Marquette, the Supreme Court held that the applicable usury ceiling in a credit card
transaction was the usury limit of the state where the card issuer was located, rather than the
state where the card customer was located. The result was a rapid move to states such as
South Dakota and Delaware, states with very high or even no usury ceilings. Many other states
quickly raised their usury ceilings to prevent this migration, especially those with a substantial
banking presence.264 By locating in high-ceiling states, Marquette essentially deregulated the
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interest-rate component of credit cards and enabled card issuers to directly avoid traditional
usury restrictions and to “export” their interest rates.
Critics claim that Marquette’s functional deregulation of credit card interest rates led to
high and permanent credit card profitability that competition has been unable to temper.265 As
we already have seen, it is incorrect to conclude that profits in the credit card industry have
been high and permanent, especially when adjusted for the ex ante riskiness of credit card
operations and when studied over an appropriate length of time. This Section demonstrates that
the impact of Marquette on credit use and profitability has also been fundamentally
misunderstood. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Marquette did not lay a foundation for
runaway bank profits and consumer suffering. Rather, by eliminating archaic and largely
ineffective usury restrictions, Marquette increased efficiency and competition in the credit card
industry, made the market more responsive to consumer demand, and provided large benefits to
consumers.

A. Was Marquette Irrelevant?
As an initial matter, it is difficult to understand how Marquette could have had any
effect on credit card interest rates and credit card profits, as interest rates did not actually rise
following Marquette. As has been noted, the alleged effect of Marquette was to keep interest
rates the same as they were previously, even though the cost of funds was falling. But usury
ceilings generally were a cap set on interest rates at a fixed rate – indeed, this is the explanation
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for why credit card issuers were unable to raise their rates during the high interest rate period of
the late-1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the only effect of usury ceilings was to keep rates from
rising above a fixed level. Usury ceilings were fundamentally irrelevant to the issue of whether
rates should subsequently fall below that level as the cost of funds fell. Usury regulations are
simply irrelevant to the question of what is the appropriate interest rate at rates below
the usury cap. Thus, the entire argument about the effect of Marquette on subsequent interest
rates and credit card profitability appears to be based on the logically flawed premise that usury
regulations would even apply to the transactions in question.266

B. A Short History of Usury Regulations
Assuming that Marquette and state usury regulations even have some relevance to the
question at hand, it is evident that its importance has been generally misunderstood. Western
financial and legal systems have a long history of intermittent attempts to regulate maximum
interest rates. Credit itself is as ancient as humanity. Credit long predates industry, banking,
coinage, and probably even money. 267 Homer and Sylla observe, “Loans at interest may be
said to have begun when the Neolithic farmer made a loan of seed to a cousin and expected
more back at harvestime.”268
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Efforts to regulate the terms of these loans followed soon thereafter.269 As early as
1800 B.C., the Code of Hammurabi contained statutory limitations on interest rates.270 The
Code permitted wife, concubines, children, and slaves to be pledged as collateral, but limited
personal slavery for debt to three years.271 Ancient Athens, by contrast, eliminated both interest
rate ceilings on debt as well as personal slavery for debt.272 Rome limited interest rates to 8
1/3%, but permitted personal slavery for debt.273
These legal caps on interest rates usually had little practical effect. When the legal rate
was higher than the prevailing market rate they were irrelevant; when market rates were higher
than the legal rate, the legal rate was usually simply ignored.274 For instance, the limits set by
Hammurabi apparently were much higher than prevailing Babylonian interest rates.275 When
market rates rose above Hammurabi’s limits, however, those limits were simply ignored.276
Market forces similarly kept Roman interest rates well below the statutory cap, but when
interest rates rose, the Romans simply refused to enforce the limits.277 As old as attempts to
regulate usury are comparable attempts by market forces to escape usury regulations.
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Perhaps the watershed event in the history of usury was the theological disputes over
whether interest of any kind should be charged on debts. Although Middle Age church teaching
banned lending money for interest, “usury was always present in Medieval Europe.”278
But unlike Babylon and Rome, the power of the church in the Middle Ages made it
difficult to simply ignore the restrictions on usury when they became inconvenient. As a result,
lenders and borrowers had to devise more creative ways of evading usury restrictions. The
lengths to which they went to avoid these restrictions demonstrates the power of the market in
the lending sphere and the difficulties of regulation. For instance, medieval merchants could
avoid religious prohibitions on usury by writing a note in one currency and promising repayment
some time later in another currency at a vastly inflated exchange rate, making the whole thing
look suspiciously like the payment of interest.279 Such ingenious devices as the “triple contract,”
“rentes,” and “interesse” were also used to evade usury restrictions.280 Given the strength of the
invisible hand in bringing lenders and borrowers together, the imagination of market participants
always outran the ability of regulators to prevent these deals from occurring. As one
commentator has summarized the world’s long history of failed attempts to regulate interest
rates;

The demand for loans cannot be legislated away; yet lenders are understandably
reluctant to risk their capital in interest-free loans when profits can be obtained
elsewhere. Doubtless, there were always some high-minded people who lent to
the needy out of a spirit of brotherhood. Generally, though, self-interest is
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highly corrosive of moral principle. Needy borrowers found that they must
either pay interest or do without the loan.281
The Reformation blessed the practice of charging interest, and England eventually led the way in
abolishing all fixed legal limits on the rate of interest.282
In the United States, however, usury laws setting fixed maximum rates of interest were
made an early part of the law and continued intermittently for much of American history. For
much of that time, these interest rate ceilings were irrelevant, as the legal rate of interest was set
at levels higher than the prevailing market rate of interest. When not irrelevant, they were
evaded. As in the Old World, attempts to regulate interest rates in America were unsuccessful
almost from the beginning. During the colonial era, Benjamin Franklin reported that interest
rates routinely exceeded legal limits, leading a modern commentator to conclude that colonial
“usury laws seem to have been widely evaded.”283 Efforts during the post-Revolution era also
met with little success, as “during hard times, the usury limits were evidently ignored.”284 Similar
efforts to regulate usury and similarly poor results continued through the Civil War. Finally, in
the post-Civil War era, many states simply gave up on the effort to regulate interest rates,
leading to widespread increases or elimination of rate ceilings by the turn of the century.285
Those that did not effectively eliminate ceilings riddled them with exceptions that stripped them
of much of their effect.286
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Ironically, when market rates of interest rose such that these usury limitations actually
were relevant, states quickly moved to raise or abolish the interest rate ceilings so that they no
longer placed a constraint on the market.287 To the extent that these interest rate ceilings were
not simply evaded through other terms of the contract, they had the effect of restricting access
to credit for many people who needed it. As a result, where the usury rates actually constrained
interest rates they also constrained access to credit and created other market distortions. Thus,
they were unpopular with the public and were quickly eliminated or amended. A common
approach to the problem was to create a series of exceptions to the usury restrictions, thereby
allowing interest rates to rise to their market levels and consumers to shift into those markets
where the exceptions controlled. Thus, it has been observed that “[s]ince colonial times, the
history of American usury law has been a history of exceptions. By the 1950s, these exceptions
threatened to overwhelm the rule. Although nearly all states retained a general usury limit,
regulation was increasingly provided by a bewildering and disorganized array of statutory
exceptions.”288
Various lenders were also frequently excepted from the general usury laws. Many
states excepted credit unions, savings and loans, and industrial banks from the reach of usury
laws.289 Some states took bank loans out from the reach of usury laws and pawnbrokers were
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covered by a wholly different body of county or city laws.290 In 1968, usury laws applied to
less than half of America’s credit.291
Among those who generally were covered, however, were credit card issuers. As
unprecedented interest rates during the 1970s drove the cost of funds higher for banks, bank
card issuers were unable to raise interest rates on their cards to rates that would make them
profitable.292

C. The Problems of the pre-Marquette Regime
The ease with which usury restrictions can be evaded should not be surprising. Lending
presents a paradigm application of Coasian bargaining in a context of low transaction costs.
Experiments with rent control, price controls on gasoline, and other forms of price controls have
repeatedly shown the futility of regulating any single term of a multi-term transaction. Price
controls have several inevitable consequences. In the short run, by keeping prices below their
market-clearing level, they increase demand for, and decrease supply of, the product in
question, thereby creating shortages.293 Gasoline lines provide a memorable reminder of failed
efforts at price controls. In the longer run, however, they cause adjustments in other terms of
the contract so as to push the overall price back to equilibrium. Thus, when gasoline prices
were regulated, consumers were forced to pay by waiting in line, an irrational and inefficient
mechanism for reestablishing equilibrium. This adjustment will be especially rapid in situations
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such as bank lending, where lenders and borrowers can readily alter the terms of the contract at
the time they enter into the deal. The end result is the restoration of equilibrium at the same
overall market price, but a loss in efficiency and consumer welfare.
Efforts to regulate interest rates on consumer loans in the pre-Marquette era were not
immune from these perverse and wasteful results.294 Unable to respond to increasing cost of
funds, bank card issuers responded by initiating annual fees for cardholders and adopting more
restrictive lending policies.295 Thus, bank card issuers responded to the inability to interest rates
at their competitive level in two predictable ways: by restricting supply of the regulated form of
credit and by altering other terms of the credit card agreement so as to try to close the remaining
gap between supply and demand.296 Banks reduced supply by curtailing their bank card
operations during the 1970s because of their inability to make a profit.297 Given that lowerincome individuals will generally have less access to alternative competitive sources of credit,298
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this constriction in card supply likely caused harm to the very low-income consumers that usury
controls are ostensibly designed to help.299
Card issuers also attached annual fees to customers accounts as a mechanism for
evading usury restrictions. As noted earlier, consumers have repeatedly expressed their dislike
for annual fees as a component of credit card terms.300 By forcing bank card issuers to impose
annual fees rather than raise interest rates, it is evident that the direct effect of usury limitations
on credit card operations was to reduce consumer welfare by forcing banks to offer a less
attractive product than they could in a deregulated market. Christopher DeMuth observes that
suppliers will respond to price controls on one term of its product:

by raising prices in ways that are not controlled by the regulatory program. . . .
If such pricing responses are feasible, price controls will be circumvented.
Consumers will be worse off than before, however, since the new pricing
system will be less efficient and hence more costly than the one it replaced. If
the alternative pricing system were less costly, it could and presumably would
be introduced absent the controls.301
Deadweight loss inevitably results, imposing a tax paid by borrowers and lenders alike.
Issuers adopted several other innovations to evade usury limits, all of which worked to
the detriment of consumers. For instance, banks altered their methods of calculating interest
charges, moving from the adjusted balance method, which calculated interest on the balance at
the time payment was due, to the average daily balance system, which assessed interest from
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the date a charge was made.302 They also started marketing other products and services, such
as insurance, with monthly statements; they bundled credit cards with a variety of other bank
services, such as checking and check-cashing cards, and offered the complete package to
customers; and they started selling customer lists to mailing houses, a practice so distasteful that
is was eventually outlawed.303
Usury limitations also created a subsidization from convenience users of credit cards to
revolvers. All users, regardless of whether they revolved debt, were forced to pay annual fees
so as to compensate for these losses. As a result, convenience users were being forced to
make up for the losses banks were suffering by their inability to raise interest rates on revolvers.
This arbitrary redistribution of wealth and income among consumers is a typical consequence of
price controls.304 The post-Marquette deregulation of interest rates enabled the appearance of
the no-annual fee card in the last decade, resulting in a massive explosion in convenience credit
card use that continues today.
This also helps to explain the stickiness of interest rates in the post-Marquette era. The
imposition of annual fees amounted to a de facto increase in the interest rate so as to restore
equilibrium without violating express usury limitations. Therefore, it follows that the elimination
of annual fees in the 1990s should be similarly seen as a de facto reduction in interest rates.
Thus, it is significant to observe that as the cost of funds fell throughout the 1990s, credit card
issuers responded first by eliminating annual fees. This makes sense, as annual fees are disliked
by consumers and because they are an extremely inefficient and roundabout mechanism for
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passing through increased costs to consumers. As the cost of funds continued to drop
throughout the 1990s, however, then card issuers started to reduce interest rates.305 The timing
is instructive: the rapid and sustained drop in interest rates began around 1994 which follows
almost exactly on the heels of the elimination of annual fees in the early 1990s. Focusing on only
nominal-interest-rate stickiness ignores the reality that the proper measure of card cost and
competition must include the presence or absence of annual fees as well. As Canner and
Luckett observe, “[w]hen funding costs began to decline significantly after 1981, credit card
rates remained mostly at their existing levels, in part because they had been constrained from
rising to an equilibrium level when funding costs were climbing; the decline in funding costs
tended to restore equilibrium.”306
To the extent that suppliers cannot respond to price caps by repricing other aspects of
their product (in this case annual fees), “suppliers will reduce the quantity or quality of their
products or services.”307 The existence of usury laws had a pronounced negative effect on the
quality of credit cards. 308 It has only been since deregulation that the market has seen the
dramatic expansion in the benefits associated with credit cards, such as greater customer
service, co-branding and affinity cards, and a myriad of other benefits.309 Waiting periods for
card approval were longer and rejection rates were higher.
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Finally, annual fees acted as a sort of “tax” on switching among credit cards, thereby
dampening competition in the credit card market.310 Annual fees discourage consumers from
carrying more than one open credit card account at a time, thereby creating a delay in time while
the customer seeks a new card. Because they are paid on an annual basis, they amount to an
annualized capital investment. Thus, annual fees also discourage a customer from switching
mid-year, which would require forgoing the return on the investment made in the old card and
paying yet another annual fee on the new card.311 By causing a substitution from interest rates
to annual fees, usury limitations directly reduced consumer welfare and indirectly reduced
consumer welfare by dampening competition in the market. Deregulation led to the entry of
AT&T, General Motors, Discover Card, and other new firms offering no-annual fee cards into
the market, shaking up the traditional power structure of the industry and increasing
responsiveness to consumer demands. By increasing competition, deregulation thus also
indirectly helped to bring about the expansion in card benefits previously discussed.
Thus, the rapid disintegration of annual fees following deregulation is significant for three
reasons. First, it demonstrates that there was a substantial loss in consumer welfare under the
pre-Marquette regime because consumers were willing to accept a higher interest rate in
exchange for a lower or no annual fee, but were not permitted to do so. Since that time, both
their words and deeds evidence a preference for no annual fees, even if that means trading off a
higher interest rate.
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Second, the appearance of annual fees as a response to usury restrictions shows the
ease with which credit card issuers can evade price controls on one contractual term by altering
a different contractual term. In this case, limitations on interest rates were offset by increases in
annual fees. Thus it illustrates the folly of looking only at interest rates as a proxy for
competition and helps to explain the stickiness of nominal interest rates following Marquette.
Third, by raising switch costs to consumers, the substitution of annual fees for
unregulated interest rates dampened competition in the credit card market. Thus, deregulation
has led to heightened competition, as the sleepy traditional leaders in the bank card market have
been eclipsed by more innovative and efficient competitors. Not only did these regulations
result in dead weight losses by leading to the imposition of annual fees, they also harmed
consumers by arbitrarily redistributing wealth from convenience users to revolvers, limiting
access to bank cards, and preventing the introduction of many ancillary benefits of card
ownership.

D. Indirect Costs of Usury Regulations
But the analysis so far has considered only the direct distortions caused to the bank
card market and harm to credit card users as a result of usury restrictions. But further
examination reveals that the perverse effects of usury regulations has additional negative
consequences for consumers that reach beyond just the bank card market. Moreover, further
examination shows the myriad of ways that usury restrictions can be evaded by credit issuers.
The end result will be additional deadweight loss, additional harm to consumers (especially
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lower-income consumers), and a negligible restriction on the overall price of credit paid by
consumers.
During the 1970s, the credit card market was dominated by large retailers such as
Sears, Montgomery Ward, and J. C. Penney. Bank cards, by contrast, were a relatively small
part of the credit card market when compared with today. Retailer credit cards grew out of a
gradual development of consumer credit in America. The conquest of the west following the
Civil War created a need for consumer credit, as many of those migrants were penniless.312
They relied on credit extended by merchants and financial intermediaries. Consumer credit
expanded following World War I, as manufacturers and retailers of more expensive household
durable goods such as cars, washing machines, and vacuum cleaners allowed consumers to
purchase these goods and pay for them over time, rather than requiring them to save for long
periods of time before they could afford them.313 Ackerman notes that, “[t]he first large-scale
use of installment credit for consumer sales was by the Singer Sewing Machine Company,
starting in 1850.”314 During the economic rebound following the Great Depression and World
War II, prototype credit cards began to appear. Leading the way were cards provided by
specific businesses, often aimed at traveling businessmen, such as oil company and hotel
cards.315 Airline cards followed soon thereafter. While usury restrictions remained on the
books, “[a]s in times past, usury laws were widely avoided in the post-war era.”316
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Prototype department store cards began to appear as well. These were an outgrowth
of the earlier practice of manufacturers extending credit to purchase household durables and the
like. Retail cards were also useful for building customer loyalty and helping merchants to keep
track of patterns of customer purchases. By 1914, several retailers began to issue cards to their
wealthy customers, and in 1928, retailers began to issue “charga-plates,” which were
embossed-metal address plates, often compared to military “dog tags” in appearance. Mandell
observes, “In fact, there is little, if any, difference between the way credit is used in the United
States today and the way it was used in the early 1800s, with the single exception of
technology.”317 Indeed, already by 1930, only 47.4% of department store sales were made for
cash, 7% were made on an installment basis, and the remaining 45.6% were made on “open
book” revolving credit.318 Thus, while universal credit cards are of relatively recent vintage, the
practice of making substantial household purchases on revolving credit is not.
In 1936, the Retail Service Bureau of Seattle established a rudimentary system of
universal credit, as they signed up over one thousand retail establishments who agreed to honor
charges by their joint customers.319 The formation of Diners Club in 1949 laid the foundation
for the development of modern bank cards. Unlike earlier cards tied to specific providers of
goods and services, Diners Club was a universal card, in that many merchants honored it. It
was also a third-party card, in that Diners Club extended the credit to the customer and paid the
merchant, rather than the merchant issuing the credit directly. As a result, Diners Club bore the
risk of nonpayment, rather than the restaurant. In return for this assured payment and the
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convenience to customers of being able to use Diners Club at a large number of locations,
accepting merchants paid a 7% fee to Diners Club for each use.320 Primarily aimed at
businessmen, to this day Diners Club remains primarily a hotel and restaurant card.321
Despite the introduction of Diners Club as a universal third-party card in 1949, such
cards were slow to take-off and the credit market remained dominated by department stores.
Department store cards continued to dominate the market through the 1970s, but – not
coincidentally – in the era following Marquette, general-use, universally accepted bank cards
emerged to increasingly dominate the market.
The existence of usury laws helps to provide the explanation for why large retailers
dominated the credit card market in the pre-Marquette period. The purposes of retailers in
running credit card operations differed substantially from issuers such as Diners Club, American
Express, and banks. The primary purpose of retail credit was to build customer loyalty and
provide customer convenience.322 As a result, retailers were willing to and usually did absorb
losses in their credit operations, so long as they furthered these larger goals.323 Retailers were
primarily interested in selling goods and services, and credit operations were seen as an
investment in achieving this goal. Thus, for retailers, the credit portion of the transaction was
intertwined with the retail portion of the transaction. As noted earlier, this provided large
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retailers with a substantial comparative advantage over smaller retailers who could not afford to
establish and maintain their own credit operations. As DeMuth observes, “Consumers do not
gain when one group of sellers (large national retailers) gains an advantage over another group
(the smaller retailers) solely because of a superior ability to adjust to price controls.”324
This ability to tie retail to credit sales also gave retail issuers of credit a comparative
advantage over third-party issuers of credit such as banks as well. Recall that the combination
of the run-up in the cost of funds in the 1970s combined with usury limitations made credit card
operations for banks unprofitable during this period. Retailers such as Sears, however, were
much less affected by this problem than banks. Banks were able to avoid some of the bite by
altering other terms of the cardholder agreement. But retailers had an even more effective way
of evading usury restrictions – they could simply bury the credit losses in the price of the goods
they offered and sell the bundled product. Given that credit operations were routinely used to
subsidize retail operations anyway, this cross-subsidization was a natural step.
Thus as Homer and Sylla observe, “As in ancient Athens, and in all other periods of
history, there has been no limit to the charges made by loan sharks. The better class of modern
loan shark skirts the law by . . . selling overpriced merchandise.”325 The result of usury
restrictions, therefore, was not to prevent credit card issuers from charging high interest rates to
consumers. Rather, its primary effect was to transfer wealth from issuers who had less ability to
evade usury restrictions to issuers who could evade usury restrictions more easily, such as by
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burying credit losses in the price of goods.326 As DeMuth observes, raising the price of goods
to offset credit costs, “may be thought of as a particularly effective repricing method; it is
apparently almost perfectly responsive, and almost impossible to control short of regulating retail
prices directly.”327
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that retailers engaged in exactly this sort of
repricing behavior in order to avoid usury restrictions.328 The results of usury restrictions are
predictable and there are a combination of responses that could be expected, ranging from
credit rationing to the growth of non-regulated forms of credit. One would expect to see some
degree of credit rationing and a marginal reduction in the amount of credit outstanding,
especially to lower-income and higher-risk borrowers. But this will not be the only effect. One
would also expect to see a substitution away from regulated forms of credit to less regulated
forms of credit. Thus, there may be some reduction in the amount of credit outstanding,
especially to lower-income and higher-risk borrowers, but some of this reduction will be offset
by a growth in other forms of credit. The trade-off between rationing credit, and substituting
less attractive forms of credit will depend on the cross-elasticity of demand among alternative
forms of credit. That balance will be a function of consumer preferences and the availability of
competing forms of credit. Regardless, consumer welfare loss results from both aspects. First,
because some people will not get credit who otherwise would; second, because those who can
still get credit will shift to other, less-attractive forms of credit.
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E. Empirical Analysis of Usury Regulations and the Case for Marquette
Due to its severe interest rate caps, Arkansas has provided a ready case study, for
several authors, to examine the impact of usury restrictions on credit markets. Empirical studies
of the effect of usury restrictions in Arkansas validate the predicted effects of usury restrictions.
First, those banks that did continue to extend consumer credit to Arkansans generally
tied consumer loan privileges to other bank activities, thereby making up credit losses by
repricing other bank services. As one economic study concluded:

[t]he sale of personal loans was more likely to be tied to the sale of other bank
services relative to the other markets. We conclude that when income from the
loan activity was restricted by regulation, Arkansas banks earned their required
return on loans by tying the sale of a loan to that of a product or products that
were not restricted in price.329
In an effort to reduce losses on consumer credit operations, banks in Arkansas also reduced the
benefits offered to customers by restricting their hours of operation below banks in states with
less restrictive usury ceilings. Finally, banks in Arkansas also imposed higher service charges on
demand deposit accounts and checking account overdrafts.330
Second, interest rate ceilings also made it more difficult for Arkansas residents to get
bank cards. Unable to charge a market rate of interest, card issuers predictably restricted
credit card privileges to only the most credit worthy customers. Indeed, bank card issuers
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canceled a number of credit card accounts during the late 1970s.331 The result was again
predictable – those unable to get access to bank cards instead made greater use of retail store
cards.332 As discussed earlier, restrictions on the extension of consumer credit also led to the
proliferation of pawn shops as a substitute source of credit.333 Thus, some have argued that
usury ceilings do not even result in a reduction in the overall credit demanded by consumers,
they just force consumers to shift from more-attractive to less-attractive forms of credit.334
Third, retailers evidenced an ability to engage in exactly the type of repricing predicted
by DeMuth, as the evidence indicates that retailers in Arkansas raised prices on certain retail
goods, essentially burying their credit losses in the price of the goods. Thus, goods such as
major appliances (the type of goods most likely to be bought with retail credit) were estimated
to cost about 3% to 8% more in Arkansas than in states with less restrictive usury ceilings.335
At the same time, retailers also apparently reduced their services, such as charging for delivery
and gift wrapping or offering fewer choices in their stores.336
These various repricing schemes are implausible means of increasing consumer welfare.
If repricing affected consumers positively, then presumably, the schemes would exist absent
interest rate controls. In fact, by encouraging credit card issuers to hide the “real” interest rate
in other prices, it probably harms consumers by making it more difficult for them to determine
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the actual cost of either the goods or the credit they are receiving. One commentator has
observed that, “[l]awyers and businessmen have expended a great deal of time and ingenuity
devising legal methods of circumventing usury limitations.”337 Some of these mechanisms are
“so complex that only mathematicians understand them.”338 Thus, although it becomes possible
to equilibrate the market through these repricing schemes, the “unfortunate side effect is
borrower confusion and bewilderment.”339 Furthermore, by segmenting the market on the basis
of the issuers’ comparative abilities to reprice the inefficiencies caused by usury restrictions, the
regulations also probably further reduced consumer welfare by reducing price competition
among the various suppliers of consumer credit.340 By making it more difficult to produce a
profitable card that consumers will actually want, usury limitations also tend to reduce entry of
new firms, further dampening competition.341
Unlike bank loans or retailers, the credit card market is also a national market.342 Thus,
to the extent that it becomes more difficult to get access to credit cards, borrowers will be
forced to make increased use of credit from local banks and retailers. Obviously this will have a
further detrimental effect on competition for loan rates, especially in rural areas where
borrowers are likely to have fewer options for consumer credit.343
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Marquette also created an ideal opportunity for an experiment of what attributes
consumers desire in a credit card. After Marquette there were two different possible regimes
that a state could implement. Because credit card terms depended on the laws of the state of
issuance, banks and consumers could forum shop. Vastly different terms could be found
between cards from relatively unregulated states, such as South Dakota and Delaware, and
heavily regulated states such as Arkansas. The “South Dakota” regime would allow market
rates of interest to be charged and with it an elimination of annual fees and an expansion of
cardholder benefits. The “Arkansas” regime, by contrast, would impose a cap on interest rates
combined with an annual fee, lower credit line, and fewer cardholder benefits.344 If consumers
favored the first mix of card attributes, issuers such as Citibank and MBNA who moved to
laissez faire states such as South Dakota and Delaware would prosper. If consumers favored
the latter, then Arkansas-based banks would come to dominate the credit card market.
Of course, just such a competition occurred following Marquette and the results are
clear; consumers overwhelmingly preferred the package of options offered by unregulated states
over regulated states.345 Indeed, despite the large expansion in the use of credit card credit
following Marquette, Arkansas-based banks actually declined in the amount of revolving credit
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they issued during this period.346 In fact, direct competition actually took place in 1991-1992,
as Simmons First National Bank of Pine Bluff, Arkansas gained widespread attention for
offering an 8.5% interest rate credit card, the low rate being a result of Arkansas’s restrictive
usury laws.347 Simmons was featured on NBC’s “Today Show,” CNN, and newspaper lists of
banks offering the best credit-card deals. It was reported that they were barely able to answer
all the phone calls they received requesting applications. Despite this widespread publicity and
interest, Simmons never became a serious player in the credit card industry, in part because they
were able to accept only one out of every five applications as a result of Arkansas’s tight usury
laws. Given the choice, consumers have overwhelmingly preferred the package of costs and
benefits offered by unregulated credit over regulated credit.348
The pre-Marquette regime probably hurt lower-income people the most. Usury caps
on credit card interest rates, combined with high interest rates, generally led to some credit
rationing by card issuers. The number of credit cards in circulation actually fell during this
period, as credit card companies tried to minimize their portfolio risk to the maximum extent. In
such a credit rationing regime, poorer consumers were the group most likely to be denied credit
cards, whereas upper income individuals are hardly effected in their access to credit.349 Again,
this drove those poorer borrowers to pawn shops, loan sharks, rent-to-own, and point-of-sale
retail credit. Given that usury restrictions uniformly injure poor individuals and provide benefits
to higher-income individuals, some have suggested that the most plausible explanation for usury
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restrictions is one of public choice – that their intent is not to help poor people at all, but to
reduce the interest rates paid by well-to-do households in the state.350
Limits on the interest rates that banks could charge also led to a substitution from bank
cards to retail credit.351 Thus, not only did usury laws restrict the competition in the credit card
market, it simultaneously harmed retail consumers through the limitation of choice, as determined
by an individual retailer’s ability to issue credit. In turn, retailers buried their credit losses in the
prices of their goods, thereby increasing prices for all of their customers. Studies have shown
that given the array of margins on which sellers can adjust to offset interest-rate caps, lowincome buyers are most strongly opposed to an increase in the price of the goods purchased.352
Thus, usury restriction resulted in the maximum possible negative effect on consumers. This also
subsidized credit purchasers, as the cash purchasers paid higher prices, without increased
benefits enjoyed by credit purchasers. In absolute terms, lower-income customers use credit
less than higher-income customers.
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In short, by denying poor people access to credit cards

and forcing an increase in the cash retail price to this same group, the pre-Marquette regime
had the unfortunate effect of forcing low-income cash purchasers to subsidize higher-income
credit shoppers, effectuating a regressive redistribution..354 As noted, this upward redistribution

350

William J. Boyes, In Defense of the Downtrodden: Usury Laws?, 39 PUBLIC CHOICE 269, 272 (1982). This
strategy is probably not wholly effective. Usury ceilings will also tend to divert funds to less-regulated
states, so richer households will not capture all of the benefits of usury restrictions. See Villegas, supra
note 349, at 140.
351
PETERSON & FALLS, supra note 50, at 35 n.6.
352
See Consumer Preferences, supra note 66, at 77.
353
Canner & Fergus, supra note 4, at 12.
354
Id. (“Higher retail prices could mean that customers who usually pay in cash – including lower-income
families who cannot obtain credit cards – would subsidize buyers who use credit card services.”). In a
discussion of this issue on the econlaw listserv, William Fischel and Howard Marvel both raised the
question of why sellers did not price discriminate between cash and credit purchasers by offering two
different prices. I do not have a ready explanation for this, other than to observe that empirical studies

119

may be the most plausible explanation for the existence of usury laws, given the harm they cause
to those they ostensibly aim to protect.355
It is difficult to understand the economic logic of actively subsidizing credit sales relative
to cash or for forcing lower-income buyers to subsidize higher-income buyers, although the
political logic is manifest. Other studies found that minorities and the poor were those hurt most
by similar usury restrictions in effect in Massachusetts during this era.356 Overall, it has been
observed that once all of the various adjustments are made in response to interest-rate ceilings,
“substantial numbers of some consumer groups will be less satisfied with the new credit terms.
It is ironic that customers who are most likely to be dissatisfied are those who are traditionally
considered to be the primary beneficiaries of such legislation – those in the lower socioeconomic
groups.”357
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F. Benefits of Marquette and the Deregulation of Credit Card Interest Rates
After Marquette, success in the credit card market became a question of who could
provide the best product to consumers at the lowest cost, rather than rewarding those with a
comparative advantage in hiding and repricing their interest rate losses in other terms and
products. By uncoupling the credit transaction from the goods transaction, Marquette made
possible the tremendous entry of bank and other issuers into the credit card market, with
consumers as the beneficiaries.
This further suggests that by making the credit market more efficient, Marquette would
reduce the cost of credit and thereby lead to an expansion in the credit card market. Much of
this expansion would be predicted to come not from an increase in overall consumer debt
burdens, but from a substitution from other forms of credit whose competition had been
benefited by Marquette, such as secured lenders, pawnbrokers, and large retailers who granted
credit. Thus, for instance, during the 1970s when Arkansas had a very restrictive usury rate of
10%, Arkansans were able to acquire less consumer credit in the form of mortgages and direct
credit, but acquired far more retail credit due to the ability of retailers to hide high credit charges
by raising the price of their goods.358 Repeal of usury regulations on credit cards alone should
not have led to a substantial increase in consumer debt overall, but merely a substitution from
other forms of debt to credit card debt. Beyond these efficiency savings, however, Marquette
can explain little of the increase in consumer debt in recent years. Rather, it is evident that the
primary factor driving this transition is consumer demand for bank cards, due to their
convenience, ancillary benefits, or their relative attractiveness as a source of credit. In short,
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there has been an exogenous outward shift in consumer demand for bank cards at the same time
that the industry was effectively deregulated.359
Thus, to the extent that Marquette even mattered in an era of falling cost of funds and
interest rates, it is difficult to argue that consumers were hurt by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Marquette. Deregulation of interest rates rationalized the market for credit cards and spurred
competition. As one commentator sums up the case against ceilings on interest rates:

The prevalence of avoidance [of interest rate ceilings] does not mean
that all businessmen are vampiric usurers. Avoidance exists because
educated lawmakers, judges, and businessmen discover that it is
frequently beneficial. In most cases, it is better to permit credit to flow
at high rates than to dry it up by enforcing a restrictive and irrational
usury ceiling. But there is a cost in avoidance. It encourages violation
of at least the spirit of the laws and lead courts into esoteric or spurious
distinctions. The businessman worries that a court may declare his
avoidance technique illegal. Finally, evasion is not selective; it permits
lenders to take advantage of unsophisticated borrowers just as much as
it permits arms length negotiators to secure beneficial credit. Avoidance
may be better than the application of some laws, but it clearly less
desirable than a rational law of interest rates.360
Given the distorting effects of usury limitations on the credit market and the negative effect it had
on consumers (especially low-income consumers), it is difficult to imagine that many bankruptcy
commentators pine for the passing of usury limitations.
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VI. Some Tentative Bankruptcy Implications of the Economics of Credit Cards
The full implications of the foregoing for the relationship between credit cards and
bankruptcy are explored in a companion article to this one.361 Nonetheless, the setting of this
symposium presents an opportunity to briefly highlight some of the obvious and direct
implications in a summary fashion. As the foregoing has indicated, most of the questions raised
about credit cards are irrelevant to bankruptcy. In fact, linking the study of credit card and
bankruptcy may undermine a sensitive analysis of both fields.
The bankruptcy community is obsessed with the volume of direct mail sent by credit
card companies. It is now understood that direct mail represents an effort to educate
consumers and reduce switch costs, and that the primary effect of direct mail has been to
redistribute existing card holders among different issuers. The limited bankruptcy implications
that result from a proper understanding of direct mail, therefore, should be obvious.362 In the
saturated market of the past decade, direct mail has not been used to find new,
“uncreditworthy” customers. Rather, it is aimed at already existing credit card customers to try
to induce them to switch to a new card issuer. Moreover, the effect of all of this competition
has been to increase consumer knowledge about credit card terms and thereby to reduce
interest rates and increase benefits. In every other industry, advertising increases competition.
The credit card industry is no exception. The question of the volume of direct mail sent by the
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credit card industry therefore, would seem to be largely irrelevant to the question of bankruptcy.
To the extent it is relevant, increased competition in the credit card industry has driven down
interest rates and other price terms, which should be reducing the bankruptcy filing rate. The
fetish in much of the bankruptcy community about the volume of direct mail sent by the credit
card industry thus seems to be largely misplaced.
Many commentators have claimed that the rise in bankruptcies and credit card defaults
in recent years can be attributed to conscious decisions by credit card issuers to expand output
in response to their extraordinary profits.363 By contrast, empirical studies as well as common
sense reject the proposition. I am aware of only two studies that have attempted to test the
proposition that increasing bankruptcies and credit card defaults in recent years have been
driven by greater extension of credit to higher-risk borrowers, and both have rejected the
hypothesis.364 The first study, by economists Donald P. Morgan and Ian Toll observes, “If
lenders have become more willing to gamble on credit card loans than on other consumer loans
credit card charge-offs should be rising at a faster rate [than non-credit card consumer loans] . .
. . Contrary to the supply-side story, charge-offs on other consumer loans have risen at virtually
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the same rate as credit card charge-offs.”365 This “suggest[s] that some other force is driving up
bad debt.”
The second study, by David B. Gross and Nicholas S. Souleles, concludes that changes
in the risk-composition of credit card loan portfolios “explain only a small part of the change in
default rates [on credit card loans] between 1995 and 1997.”366 Thus, the only two studies of
which I am aware either reject the hypothesis that the growth in default rates has been caused
by a conscious decision to extend credit to less credit-worthy borrowers, or conclude that it
accounts for very little of the surge in filings. The explanation lies elsewhere.
Further, the credit card market was effectively deregulated in 1978 and the purported
boom era of credit card profits followed soon thereafter. By contrast, profits have moderated
in the 1990s. Due to expanding consumer demand and technological advances, the great
growth in adding new credit card users was also during the 1980s; thus, the credit card market
has been largely saturated for some fifteen years. Thus, it is striking that from 1980 to 1984 –
the era of deregulation and growth in new credit card ownership – charge-offs on credit card
loans actually fell.367 It is difficult to understand how the “high profits lead to increased risk”
theory can explain a fall in delinquencies for the years immediately following deregulation, yet
somehow also explain the rise in bankruptcies and delinquencies some twenty years later.
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The failure to link increased defaults to increased profitability also casts doubt on some
of the criticisms that have been leveled at congressional efforts to reform the consumer
bankruptcy laws. For instance, Ausubel has argued that tightening consumer bankruptcy laws
will reduce charge-offs for credit card issuers, thereby further increasing their profits. In turn, he
argues, this will lead them to extend further credit to even more marginal borrowers, ironically
leading to a further increase in bankruptcies.368 This thesis is incorrect for several reasons, but
space permits a discussion of only three problems here. First, Ausubel’s flawed understanding
of the nature of competition in the credit card market leads him to conclude erroneously that
reductions in bankruptcy losses will primarily be reflected in increased profits for credit card
issuers. Actually, much of those savings will be passed onto consumers through increased
benefits and decreased price terms. Second, this thesis rests on Ausubel’s suspect notion that
the correlation between credit card defaults and bankruptcy somehow implies that increased
credit card use causes increased bankruptcy filings, and the related mistaken notion that
increases in total consumer indebtedness cause increased bankruptcy filings. Third, this ignores
the empirical findings discussed above, namely that increased bankruptcy filings do not appear
to be the result of increased credit extension to more marginal borrowers. Instead, consumers
have increased credit card use as a substitute for other forms of credit, and increased
bankruptcy filings appear to be caused primarily by a change in the economic incentives
associated with filing bankruptcy along with a reduction in the personal shame and social stigma
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associated with filing bankruptcy.369 Thus, Ausubel seems to be flatly incorrect about the likely
effects of bankruptcy reform. Bankruptcy reform will reduce the economic benefits associated
with filing bankruptcy, especially for high-income debtors, and will reinstate some of the social
stigma associated with filing bankruptcy.370 The primary result of reform, therefore, will be to
reduce bankruptcy filings, reduce the losses imposed on creditors from bankruptcy filings, and
reduce the costs of credit and goods and services for consumers who pay their bills.371
It has also been observed that the rate of consumer bankruptcies is “astonishingly highly
correlated with the rise in credit card defaults.”372 It is not clear what, if anything, this purported
correlation is supposed to mean. Some certainly have suggested that widespread credit card
use is somehow causing an increase in bankruptcies.373 But while this is one possible conclusion
to draw from this correlation, there are several other conclusions that could be drawn. One is
the well-established warning that, standing alone, correlation says nothing about causation.
Causation can be inferred from correlation only if there is a plausible theory that links the two.374
In this case, the most plausible causal link almost certainly runs in the opposite direction from
that suggested. Filing bankruptcy is a default event. It is probably more plausible that

the annual probability that its marginal customer will default. Thus, an increase in the profitability of
issuing credit cards should be expected to lead to an increase in actual defaults and actual bankruptcies.”).
369
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 180.
370
See TODD J. ZYWICKI, BANKRUPTCY AND RECIPROCITY (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law Working
Paper, Aug. 1, 1999).
371
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 222.
372
Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, supra note 79, at 250.
373
This seems to be the thrust of Professor Warren’s analysis on this point. See Warren, Bankruptcy
Crisis, supra note 181, at 1083.
374
Commentators have made similar errors in other aspects of bankruptcy policy, such as in the belief that a
purported correlation between debt-to-income ratios and the bankruptcy filing rate could somehow prove a
causal explanation for rising consumer bankruptcies, without taking into account such issues as current
debt burden, interest rates, and growth in assets. See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 222. Indeed, it is far
from clear that such a correlation even exists in the first place, given its inconsistency with recent trends as
well as in the post-recession years of 1992-1994. Id.

127

bankruptcy causes default, not the other way around. One suspects that almost exactly the
same correlation exists between home mortgage defaults, home equity loan defaults, and
automobile loan defaults.375 In every one of these situations, it is almost certainly the case that
defaults on these loans are highly correlated with bankruptcies, because bankruptcy is a default
event. In addition, data on credit card defaults and bankruptcy filing rates cannot rule out
alternative explanations, such as debtors “loading up” their credit cards on the eve of
bankruptcy or that debtors strategically choose to default on credit card loans before defaulting
on their mortgages and other secured loans. Credit card loans are unsecured and due to their
small size and the difficulties of collecting, a debtor often never needs to fear a collection action,
nor need he fear losing valuable collateral. As a result, strategic borrowers almost certainly
would default on their credit card obligations before defaulting on a mortgage, home equity loan,
or car loan that would cause them to lose the underlying collateral. The data also fails to
capture strategic use of credit cards as a mechanism for increasing equity in homes or cars prior
to filing bankruptcy or for using credit cards to pay off nondischargeable debt.376
Finally, the credit card economics raises questions about the proper approach of courts
to the nondischargeability of credit card debts under section 523(a)(2) of the Code. Some
courts have gone so far as to suggest that credit card issuers can prove reasonable reliance for
dischargeability only if the card issuer performs a full-scale credit check, as with a typical
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unsecured consumer bank loans (pawn shops, of course, do not).377 The foregoing has
suggested the error in this approach. Credit cards already suffer unusually high administrative
expenses – requiring full-scale credit checks would further escalate these costs. Perhaps more
fundamentally, to the extent that consumers are forced to bear these costs, it would dampen the
competitive process that has generated the consumer-friendly innovations of recent years, by
raising the costs of acquiring and keeping cards. As this article has shown, credit cards are a
unique combination of a transactional and credit device, with special dynamics. The attempt to
reconcile the revolutionary new instrument of credit cards with the old common law terms of
523(a)(2) threatens to disfigure both the credit card market and the law of nondischargeability .
Understanding the economics of credit cards is necessary for creating a sensible jurisprudence
in the law of nondischargeability.

VII. Conclusion
A full discussion of the relationship between credit cards and bankruptcy awaits another
day. The primary purpose of this article has been to clarify the underlying economics of credit
cards and credit card use. Credit card issuers have provided a convenient whipping-boy for
apologists for the current runaway bankruptcy system. This article has demonstrated that the
conventional wisdom in the bankruptcy community about the economics of credit cards is
incorrect. Allegations of “high profits” rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of profit
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measurements for credit card operations, by ignoring the higher risk associated with credit card
loans, and by looking only at an arbitrarily short time period for assessing credit card
profitability. Allegations of “sticky” interest rates ignore the nature of consumer credit generally
and the cost structure of credit card operations. Allegations that credit card interest rates are
“high” fail to provide a reference point for asking the question, “High compared to what?”
The role of the Marquette decision and the deregulation of credit card operations has
been widely misunderstood. Deregulation increased consumer demand for credit card markets
by making credit markets more efficient and allowed lower-income borrowers to shift away
from reliance on pawn shops and loan sharks. At the same time, technological changes and
changes in shopping habits also increased consumer demand for credit cards. The growth of
bank cards also spurred entrepreneurship and small business development by decoupling credit
transactions from retail transactions. Thus, it is almost certainly the growth in consumer demand
for credit cards and a shift away from other forms of credit that explains the growth in credit
card use since Marquette.
A necessary condition for placing the blame on credit card issuers for the recent boom
in personal bankruptcies is demonstrating that there is some permanent defect in the operation
of the credit card market that enables the persistence of profits. If the credit card market is
competitive then there is no reason to single it out for special concern, as opposed to the
numerous other consumer credit markets, from pawn shops, to personal loans, to mortgages, to
home equity loans. If the credit card market is competitive, then regulation of the market will
presumptively do more harm than good, and spiraling bankruptcy losses can be expected to be
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passed on to all consumers in the form of higher interest rates increases in other price terms, and
the loss of valued card benefits.
This article has demonstrated that the credit card market is almost certainly competitive.
It also has rebutted other sources of alleged profits, such as consumer irrationality unique to
credit cards. Both consumers and issuers have responded rationally to a powerful financial
innovation. Consumer demand, not issuers’ collective market power, drives the competitive
process. Credit cards are used as both a transaction and credit device. Focusing myopically
on only the purported link between credit cards and bankruptcy, would-be reformers have
ignored the transactional purposes of credit cards. Focusing instead on interest rates, they have
also ignored the multiple cost and benefit margins on which the credit card contract may be
adjusted. Given the apparent absence of persistent profits and consumer irrationality, the
burden now clearly rests on critics of the credit card industry to demonstrate how profits could
persist in an industry with over six thousand atomistic competitors, low barriers to entry, and
strong evidence of rational consumer choice. To date, the critics’ efforts have come up short.
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